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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Reforming EU leadership: A triple challenge 
The success of the Convention on the future of the EU will to a great extent depend upon on its 
answers to the institutional questions. Among these questions, the issue of EU leadership plays a 
crucial role. In this paper, we identify three challenges for the re-organisation of leadership in the 
Union: 
1.  Union leadership has to be more effective. The Union’s growing responsibility for truly 
governmental tasks (e.g. EMU, CFSP, JHA) makes this an imperative. Enlargement will further 
add to this necessity.  
2.  Leadership in the Union should contribute to the democratic  character of the Union. Indeed, 
leadership reform may offer an opportunity to increase the engagement of the people and the 
visibility of the Union.  
3.  Leadership reform should not fundamentally distort the Union’s institutional balance. The Union 
is no longer a normal international organisation but neither is it a sovereign political system. 
Leadership reform must maintain the precarious balance between on the one hand the European 
general interest and on the other the diversity of national interests.  
In view of these three challenges, we consider the two main strands of debate that touch upon the 
issue of leadership in the EU: first, the debate on the election of the Commission President and, 
secondly, the different proposals for reforming the Council Presidency. 
1.  Electing the Commission President 
The current (Amsterdam) provisions for selecting the Commission President are no longer tenable. 
The requirement of consensus in the European Council implies that the eventual nominee may be 
selected mainly on the merit of not provoking a veto of any head of state, rather than for being the best 
person for the job. Moreover, the current provisions fail to provide for electoral choice, which in turns 
means that the democratic accountability of the Commission remains marginal at most. 
Remarkably, we found that the Nice provisions come a long way towards satisfying the three criteria 
of democracy, efficacy and institutional balance. The move to qualified majority voting (qmv) may 
make the appointment procedure more efficacious. Moreover, it may boost the role the European 
Parliament can play in the appointment procedure, thereby rendering the appointment more 
democratic. Qmv in the European Council inevitably means that the appointment of the President will 
be more politicised.  
Therefore, the difference between the Nice provisions and European Parliament (EP) election may 
not be all that big. From a democratic point of view, however, having the Commission President 
elected by the European Parliament is preferable as it makes the process more comprehensible and 
turns the EP elections into the core political event of the EU. Contrary to what is often heard, it is 
unlikely that the Commission will develop into a ‘dominating executive’, given the heterogeneity of 
the Union, the under-development of party groups and the central role of the Council. In order to keep 
all member states on board, some balancing measures can moreover be envisaged, such as granting 
them the right to approve the EP’s nominee and to decide on the composition of the entire college, and 
possibly even a right to censure the Commission.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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Taking the analysis further, we found that a direct election also has some promising aspects. It would 
give the President a very strong democratic mandate. He/she would be able to draw upon a legitimacy 
that is separate from that of the European Parliament or the Council, providing for ‘divided 
government’. Still, doubts can be raised, given the as yet nascent European public space, whether the 
electorate is really ready for such an election. Also, this option may severely shake up the institutional 
balance, exposing the Union on the one hand to the risk of too strong a Commission President and, on 
the other, to a structural deadlock between the Commission, Council and European Parliament.  
Finally, we addressed two other alternatives involving the national parliaments. In the first of these, 
the national parliaments would actually act as an electoral college. This option was found to be 
problematic on all accounts: offering few democratic merits, distorting the institutional balance and 
contributing little to greater Union efficacy. In the second, we addressed the possibility of having the 
President elected by a congress of European and national parliamentarians. The democratic credentials 
of having the Commission President elected by a congress eventually appear rather spurious. 
Compared to the alternative of election by national parliaments, the establishment of a congress would 
better preserve the institutional balance. Still, the option creates a potential tension between the 
congress and the European Parliament and leaves clear problems of accountability that may well 
impede its efficacy. 
2.  Reforming the Presidency 
Lately, the Presidency of the Council has become the subject of ever more debate. The current 
organisation of the Council Presidency is firmly embedded in the Union’s institutional balance. The 
system has become increasingly inefficient, however, especially in terms of external presence. The 
rotating Presidency has become too much of a burden to bear for national governments and its 
discontinuity gives rise to serious problems. It is not without democratic merit, but this remains rather 
limited and indirect. Enlargement will increase the current inefficacy, whilst reducing the advantages 
in terms of institutional balance and democracy. Reform is therefore required. 
One possible solution has been the proposal launched by Chirac, Blair and Aznar to replace the 
rotating Council Presidency by a permanent President of the EU, chosen by the European Council 
from among its former members. Besides chairing the European Council, such a President would play 
a key role in the development of the Union’s foreign and defence policies and represent the Union at 
the highest international level. Not every one is convinced of the merits of this proposal, however. It is 
feared that such a President might strengthen the Council over the communitarian institutions, and the 
big member states over the small ones. Its merits in terms of external representation may eventually 
appear rather spurious as well. Finally, it adds nothing in terms of democracy.  
Another option would be to retain the rotating Presidency by re-centring it on its procedural 
responsibilities, while transferring most of its executive tasks to the Commission. The Commission’s 
authority would be enhanced by having the Commission President elected by the European 
Parliament. This would have notable advantages in terms of democracy and may also increase the 
Union’s efficacy by fostering a greater synergy between the Council and the Commission. Still, in 
order to preserve the institutional balance, precautions are needed to preclude the Union from 
developing into an outright parliamentary system and to ensure that the strengthened Commission will 
retain the confidence of the member states. 
Both of these models remain caught in the opposition between more intergovernmental and more 
supranational elements in the Union. Since both retain the distinction between the Council Presidency 
and the Commission President but strengthen one side over the other, they risk undermining the 
institutional balance in the EU. Any successful reorganisation of executive leadership in the Union 
needs to overcome the gap between intergovernmental and supranational conceptions. More 
concretely, it has to prevent the emergence of a ‘parallel Europe’ around the Commission and the 
Council, with two competing administrative structures, both with their own President competing for 
Union leadership. Notably, the recent Franco-German proposal for a reformed dual Presidency (Chirac 
and Schröder, 2003) seems to set the course for exactly such a parallel Europe and therefore looks like 
the perfect recipe for conflict and even deadlock.  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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The solution to the current dual presidency dilemma can be found by unifying the Presidency of the 
European Council and the Commission. Outfitted with a double hat, the new President could restore 
confidence in the relationship between the Council and the Commission. A unified Presidency could 
also increase the effectiveness of executive leadership in the Union and enhance its visibility, both at 
home and in the world. For this, a unified Presidency should be accompanied by a clearer location of 
agenda-setting powers, a coherent organisation of external responsibilities and a fusion of 
administrative structures.   
Still, there are some serious risks in a unified Presidency, especially if the President would only be 
elected by and accountable to the (European) Council. In this case, once enjoying a secure support in 
the European Council, the President’s powers would be subject to few checks and balances. The role 
of the European Parliament might well be reduced to that of a critical bystander unable to make an 
effective fist, and the Commission may lose much of its independence. 
Thus, if this model is to be put in place, it is crucial that the President’s powers be subject to effective 
political constraints. Both the European Council and the European Parliament should be able to hold 
the President and the Commission accountable. The Union’s balance would still be distorted if the 
President would command a stable majority in either house, leaving the remaining minority alienated 
from executive power. This consideration combines with democratic considerations to argue that the 
President should be endowed with a separate legitimacy, distinct from that of either the European 
Parliament or the Council. We thus suggest having the future Union President directly elected by the 
citizenry or, during a transitory period, by a Congress.  
Further accompanying reforms are needed to ensure the full involvement of the member states. The 
President should be bound to maintain a privileged relationship with the member states, especially 
through the European Council. In particular, one can imagine granting the member states the exclusive 
right to nominate candidates for the President. Also the Council and the European Parliament might be 
given the power to veto (individually) any nominee put forward by the President for the College of 
Commissioners.  
In order to assuage fears that the Union would turn into the much-dreaded superstate, the ability of the 
member states to control its political course could be assured by the following measures:  
−  Member states in the Council could retain a primary say on all purely ‘governmental matters’ 
(CFSP, EMU, police and judicial cooperation), although the involvement of the reformed 
Commission should be beefed up. 
−  The President would be assisted by a double-hatted Foreign Secretary appointed by and directly 
accountable to the member states. 
−  The member states could be granted a right of initiative for some matters (CFSP), possibly with a 
right of assent for the Commission and the Foreign Secretary. 
−  The multi-annual legislative agenda could be based on an inter-institutional agreement between 
the European Parliament, the Commission and the European Council. 
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Rien ne se crée sans les hommes. Rien ne dure sans les institutions. 
(J. Monnet) 
Introduction: In search of Union leadership 
As European cooperation took off in the 1950s, it focused on concrete economic tasks. It did not 
require a strong central ‘government’. Over the years, however, the nature of European integration has 
changed considerably. The establishment of the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
complemented the former European Communities with two pillars of ‘real politics’: a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
The creation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been another landmark. At this moment 
the Union is about to take another historical step: after several earlier rounds of enlargement, it will 
end the East-West divide of Europe by accepting a dozen or more new member states. 
Yet, while European cooperation has evolved towards a truly political Union covering the entire 
continent, its institutional structure has undergone far less change. From the Treaty of Rome onwards, 
the European architecture has been built upon a remarkably stable institutional triangle: the 
(European) Council is the supreme political body, the Commission prepares legislation and 
coordinates its implementation, and the European Parliament monitors the Commission’s performance 
and is involved in the legislative process. These fundamentals have hardly been touched.  
By now, many signs indicate a pressing need to reconsider the institutions that serve the Union. Ten 
years after Maastricht, the need for European action in the areas of CFSP and JHA has become ever 
more urgent, but so far the tangible achievements in these fields fall short of the ambitions expressed. 
Moreover, the completion of EMU requires stronger economic governance (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 
2001). At the same time, enlargement from the current 15 to 25 and more member states is bound to 
magnify diversity within the Union that can only be handled if there is a corresponding increase in 
coordinating powers. Since previous attempts at tackling these challenges have failed, the European 
Council has convened a Convention on the Future of the EU ‘to consider the key issues arising for the 
Union’s future development and try to identify the various possible responses’ (European Council, 
2001). 
In this paper, we address one issue that is bound to play a key role in the eventual institutional 
framework that the Convention will have to develop: Union leadership. As stated above, there was 
little need for leadership within the Union architecture at its origins. In the first section below, we 
outline how leadership tasks have come to be allocated among the institutions in a rather ad hoc 
manner. This discussion shows that a structural re-organisation of leadership is required. Drawing 
upon the analysis, we submit that any solution to Union leadership will need to be assessed in the light 
of three basic criteria: efficacy, democracy and the preservation of the institutional balance.  
The core sections of this paper approach the question of leadership from two angles. First, we revisit 
the longstanding debate on the democratisation of the selection of the Commission President. 
Secondly, we turn to the more recent debate on a permanent president for the European Council. In 
each case, the various proposals are systematically analysed in the light of the criteria introduced. In 
the concluding section, the two debates are brought together, as we seek to identify a way of 
reorganising Union leadership that increases effectiveness, enhances democracy and preserves the 
institutional balance.  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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1.  Union leadership: Past and prospects 
1.1  Current leadership positions in the EU 
Executive power in the Union is shared between the (European) Council and the Commission. As a 
corollary, executive leadership in the Union is divided between the presidencies of both institutions. 
More recently, the Presidency of the Council has been complemented by the creation of a High 
Representative of the CFSP, who assists the Council Presidency in the external representation of the 
Union. An analysis of a more effective and accountable leadership of the Union has to start from a 
reconsideration of these three functions. 
The Commission President 
The European Commission is the most permanent embodiment of European political cooperation. The 
role of the Commission in the European political process has been characterised as being ‘rather more, 
and rather less’ than ‘the civil service of the EU’ (Nugent, 1999: 85). The Commission is ‘more’ to the 
extent that it plays a prominent role as the agenda-setter in the legislative process and acts as the 
‘guardian of the treaties’. Furthermore, it plays a major administrative and regulatory role and 
manages the budget. The Commission is considerably ‘less’ than a full-blown executive as its powers 
have been strictly circumscribed and apply only in a limited number of political fields. 
Notwithstanding the collegial nature of the Commission, the position of Commission President has 
acquired considerable significance (Nugent, 1999: 106-7). Formally acting as a primus inter pares, the 
Commission President drafts the general policy programme of the Commission, represents the 
Commission vis-à-vis the other institutions and to the public and oversees the workings of the 
Directorates-General through the Secretariat-General. He/she also chairs the weekly meetings of the 
College, and exercises the deciding vote in the event of a tie in the College.  
The powers of the Commission President have been revised in the Nice Treaty. The new Art. 217 
formalises previous practice in providing that the President can freely allocate and reshuffle the 
responsibilities of the other Commissioners.
1 Moreover, the Treaty provides that the Commission 
President can dismiss any Commissioner after obtaining the approval of the College.
2 Finally, the 
Treaty now also foresees that the Council and the President nominee appoint the other Commissioners 
on the basis of proposals from each member state. 
In the end, the powers of the Commission President find their limits with the remit given to the 
Commission. The member governments have so far carefully limited the Commission’s authority in 
the common foreign and security policy, defence, economic policy, and police and criminal affairs. 
Instead the member states have preferred to scatter executive powers in these fields among the Council 
Presidency, the Council Secretariat, the High Representative and specialised agencies. As a result, the 
Commission President has been excluded from some of the most prominent European policies.  
The Council Presidency 
The Council is in many respects the bottleneck of the Union. Bringing together the governments of the 
member states, the Council commands the process by which European powers are allocated and 
exercised. The Council has both executive and legislative powers. It is the place where 
intergovernmental policies (CFSP, ESDP and cooperation in police and criminal matters) are decided 
and national policies are coordinated. Moreover, no legislative act can pass without the consent of the 
Council. And also after legislation has been passed, the Council retains a firm control on the executive 
                                                      
1 See Declaration no. 32 attached to the Amsterdam Treaty and Art. 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission adopted on 16 September 1999. 
2 Though this may appear as a strengthening of the powers of the Commission President, it can be argued that it 
actually constitutes a weakening, because under current practice a Commission member will resign if requested 
to do so by his/her President, without requiring the approval of a majority in the College (F. Dehousse, 2001).  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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process, through the national implementation of this legislation or by overseeing the implementation 
by the Commission through the committees it has installed (‘comitology’) (Joerges and Vos, 1999).  
To look after its tasks in the various policy domains, the Council has evolved into a complex structure 
encapsulating various ministerial formations and numerous administrative committees. While at one 
time legislative activity was distributed across more than 20 ministerial Council formations, the 
Seville European Council in 2002 set their number at nine. The General Affairs Council is supposed to 
play a central coordinating role among these various formations. In practice, however, it has often 
failed to do so, and as a consequence ever more tasks have been put before the European Council.  
The European Council serves as the platform for the heads of state and government of the European 
Union, on an informal basis from 1975 onwards and since 1986 on the basis of various treaty 
provisions. It provides the European Union with strategic guidelines and political impetus. In addition, 
the European Council gets involved in policy decisions when the respective Council formations fail to 
reach agreement or when the Treaties explicitly require it to act. The European Council has, moreover, 
taken an important role in foreign and defence policy (de Schoutheete and Wallace, 2002). 
The ‘leadership’ of the (European) Council is assumed by the Presidency. The basic responsibility of 
the Presidency is the organisation and chairing of Council meetings (and its subordinate bodies) during 
the time of office. While this may be considered a mere procedural responsibility, the Presidency 
actually enjoys considerable powers by controlling the timing and the content of these meetings. 
Moreover, the Presidency is also responsible for representing the Council vis-à-vis the other European 
institutions and for representing the Union vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  
Each member state holds the Presidency of the (European) Council in turn for six months. A rotating 
Presidency is a well known device in international treaty organisations. It prevents the emergence of a 
strong permanent centre that may come to dominate the autonomy of the constituting members and 
ensures the basic equality of all members. At the same time, holding the Presidency may serve to stir 
up the commitment to the European project in each member state in turn.  
The burden of the Presidency has increased significantly over time. In particular, the emergence of 
CFSP has put extra responsibilities upon the Presidency. Pressures on the organisation of the 
Presidency will rise even further after the next round of enlargement. Given the limited resources and 
experience of the countries joining, doubts have been raised whether their administrations are properly 
equipped to take on the Presidency. What is more, if the rotating scheme would be maintained, this 
would imply that any state would hold the Presidency only once in every 12 years.  
The High Representative 
As it emerged that the external representation of the Union required considerably more involvement 
than could be expected from the member government holding the Presidency, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam beefed up the role of the Secretary-General of the Council by introducing the function of 
High Representative (HR) of the CFSP. The HR assists the Presidency in its external representation 
role. He/she also contributes to the formulation, drawing-up and implementation of political decisions 
by the Council. The HR is moreover responsible for the several CFSP committees and agencies. 
Finally, he/she can, at the request of the Presidency, act on behalf of the Council and conduct political 
dialogues with third parties. In 1999, Javier Solana was appointed as the first HR for a period of five 
years.  
Formally, the function of the HR is an administrative rather than a political function: the HR has no 
official powers of his/her own and limited means. Moreover, the HR’s powers only concern the CFSP; 
the other external policies are being dealt with by the Commission under the aegis of the 
Commissioner responsible for external relations (Relex). In practice, however, the HR is much more 
than an EU ambassador and the political nature of the function is hard to deny. This is partly the 
personal achievement of Javier Solana, who has been extraordinarily agile in making the most of his 
role within a web of often-conflicting pressures.   C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Indeed, the HR has to tread a thin line between acting on his own initiative and waiting for a specific 
mandate from the Council. Moreover, though formally under no obligation to the supranational 
institutions of the Commission and Parliament, he/she has to take care not to offend them and in 
particular to ensure that his actions do not conflict with those of the Relex Commissioner. In the end, 
however, the HR is first and foremost accountable to the Council. This particular relationship is the 
key difficulty that any move towards closer integration of the functions of the HR and the Relex 
Commissioner will need to overcome. 
1.2  Reforming EU leadership: A triple challenge 
The foregoing review of the current state of leadership in the Union reveals it to be problematic on 
several accounts. Above all it is clear that the current organisation fails to deliver effective leadership, 
while the need for it has steadily increased. However, any reconsideration of leadership in the Union 
has to take account of other values beyond efficacy. For a start any reform to improve efficacy needs 
to be matched by adequate measures to ensure democratic accountability. Finally we want to draw 
special attention to the fact that reorganisations of EU leadership need to pay respect to the precarious 
institutional balance that is maintained in the Union between, on the one hand, the idea of a general 
European interest and, on the other, the diversity of national interests. Hence, reforming EU leadership 
faces a triple challenge: it should be rendered more efficacious and more democratic, whilst respecting 
the Union’s institutional balance. 
Efficacy 
The review of leadership in the EU reveals that the demand for it has steadily increased, as ever more 
executive tasks have been taken up at the European level. These also include, moreover, truly 
‘governmental’ tasks, such as macroeconomic management, foreign and defence policy and police 
matters.  
Nevertheless, the present demand for EU leadership is not matched by an adequate supply. The current 
organisation of leadership tasks has come about in a rather ad-hoc fashion. Leadership tasks have been 
scattered around different positions and bodies, which complicates coordination among them. In turn, 
this hampers the visibility and accountability of leadership positions in the EU. This especially holds 
for the Union’s external presence, and leaves the EU a political dwarf on the world stage, despite its 
economic weight. 
Hence the first challenge for the organisation of future EU leadership is to increase its efficacy. 
Leadership reform in the Union can contribute to a better overall running of the political processes 
within the Union. Most notably, effective leadership within the complex Union architecture should 
strengthen coordination powers across the institutional divides that currently exist. This is not only a 
matter of the formal attribution of powers; it also requires the position of leadership to be actually able 
to command support from the various Union institutions. In this context one also has to give due 
consideration to the question whether the organisation of leadership within the Union can be shaped in 
such a way as to ensure that the position(s) involved will attract the best-qualified people. Further, the 
lack of external presence is often pointed to as an important indicator of the deficiencies of Union 
leadership. A major test for leadership of the Union is thus whether international actors will recognise 
that it provides them with an equal and credible interlocutor. 
Democracy 
For some time now, observers have harboured serious misgivings about the democratic character of 
the European Union (cf. Weiler et al., 1995; Lodge, 1997; Dehousse, 1995; Moravcsik, 2002). The 
weak connection between Europe’s citizens and its institutions is a direct reflection of the fact that, 
wherever power is exercised in the Union, citizens do not feel they have much of an impact on it. Any 
strengthening of European leadership will thus need to be complemented by adequate mechanisms for 
democratic accountability.   T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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Indeed, there is a clear pressure to have any strengthening of leadership in the Union combined with 
effective mechanisms of electoral choice through which the public can effectively influence the choice 
between one or another candidate(s).  
To instil democratic accountability into the Union, however, will require more than the mere extension 
of the European Parliament’s powers. For the moment, the democratic legitimacy of the Parliament 
remains disputed as long as its seats are contested in ‘second-order elections’ with low turnouts, 
various national voting rules and voting behaviour reflecting mainly the national political situation 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). And even though the European Parliament 
has been able to increase its functional efficiency over time, its representative function remains 
underdeveloped as the expression of ideological differences is suppressed by its tendencies towards 
technocratic reasoning and decision-making by consensus (Magnette, 2001a). 
Moreover, any assessment of the democratic potential of reforms of Union leadership should look 
beyond the electoral mechanisms to the broader context in which citizens engage with and appreciate 
the Union. Public appeal and engagement may in the end be more important democratic factors than 
the actual electoral procedure. Leadership reform might also contribute to the Union becoming more 
transparent and comprehensible (Magnette, 2001b). Furthermore, European leadership should be 
organised in ways that foster the emergence of European parties and the necessary organisational and 
media infrastructure through which they can interact. Offering European citizens electoral choice may 
be instrumental in creating such a European public sphere, as the resulting politicisation of and 
competition for Union leadership will raise the salience of the EU in national political debates (Risse, 
2002). 
Institutional balance 
These two groups of considerations – effectiveness and democracy – represent the dichotomy that 
pervades all literature on democratic institutional engineering (Dahl, 1994; Sartori, 1994; Scharpf, 
1999). In the specific context of the European Union, we add a third perspective that is crucial to the 
distinct nature of the Union as a political system: the preservation of the Union’s institutional balance. 
The Union is no longer a normal international organisation but neither is it a sovereign political 
system. It derives its powers (as well as the legitimacy to exercise them) from two sources: the 
governments of each member state represented in the Council and the citizens of these states as 
represented by the European Parliament (Dehousse, 1995).  
Any attempt to reform Union leadership will have to respect the precarious political balance between 
on the one hand the idea of a general European interest and on the other the diversity of national 
interests (Prechal, 1998; Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002). As Convention President Giscard d’Estaing 
(2002) puts it: ‘If power is concentrated around the Council, the general European interest will no 
longer be taken into account, and the equality of citizens will be sacrificed to the equality of states. If a 
similar concentration of power takes place around the truly communitarian institutions – excluding the 
Council - it would be the interests of the member states that would no longer be able to express 
themselves and (…) the equality of states, small or big, will no longer be recognised besides the equal 
representation of citizens’. 
One implication of this is that leadership selection in the Union cannot simply be subject to majority 
rule, because in a majoritarian (‘fused’) model the executive is able to dominate the legislature by 
commanding a secure majority in it (‘dictatorship of the executive’) (Hix, 2002b). As a consequence, 
certain member states might be permanently excluded from power, as they would only be represented 
in the minority. Rather than fusing legislative and executive powers, leadership in the Union should be 
subject to a system of checks and balances resembling the model of ‘divided government’.  
Thus, any reform of leadership in the Union will have to ensure that the relations with the 
intergovernmental and with the supranational institutions are properly looked after. With regard to the 
Council, structural guarantees are required to make certain that Union leadership will not be 
permanently alienated from any one member state. On the other hand, the European Parliament ought  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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not to be monopolised by the executive, but should instead continue to play its independent role as 
‘controlling parliament’ (Dann, 2002).  
Table 1. Three dimensions for evaluation  
Efficacy of office  Democracy  Institutional balance 
-  Coordinating powers 
-  Embeddedness 
-  (External) visibility 
-  Selection by merit 
-  Comprehensibility  
-  Openness  
-  Electoral choice 
-  Public appeal  
-  European political and public 
sphere 
-  Harmonious institutional 
balance 
-  Relations with 
intergovernmental institutions 
-  Relations with supranational 
institutions 
In short, we submit that any reorganisation of leadership in the EU needs to be assessed from three 
fundamental perspectives: efficacy, democracy and the institutional balance (a full description of this 
framework is given in the annex). These three dimensions are neither logically exclusive nor fully 
comprehensive. There are some obvious respects in which they impinge upon each other. However, 
each of them catches a distinct line of argument for reorganising leadership in the Union. Any 
proposal for reform deserving of attention will need to demonstrate tangible benefits along at least one 
of these dimensions. At the same time, it should not impose severe costs on the other dimensions. 
2.   (S)electing the Commission President 
As the Commission has acquired ever more political prominence, there has been an increasing concern 
to subject its powers to political controls. Certainly from Jacques Delors onwards, the post of 
Commission President had been recognised as a (potentially) very powerful one. As a result, the 
appointment of the Commission President has come to receive ever more attention. In the European 
Council, the nomination of the Commission President has been the subject of heated debate.  
At the same time, there has been increasing pressure to subject the selection of the Commission to 
democratic control. In national democratic systems, elections generally determine who is to hold 
executive office. Executives who fail to deliver are prone to be thrown out at the next elections. While 
the Commission has to some extent developed into a European executive, its composition is only in 
the most indirect way linked to the European citizenry. Since the European Parliament plays only a 
secondary role in the selection procedure, European elections do not have direct influence. National 
elections, on the other hand, are instrumental in determining the composition of the European Council, 
but their impact remains rather indirect and tangential as only governmental parties are represented 
and their decision is conditional upon the agreement of others. All in all, the selection of the 
Commission is at no point genuinely subject to electoral choice. 
Given this shortcoming, proposals to elect the Commission President by the citizens (directly or 
indirectly) have been gaining ground. It is important to underline that the election of the Commission 
President does not amount to the election of the entire Commission. It is thus possible to elect the 
Commission President, whilst sticking to the current provisions for designating the other 
Commissioners. 
Democratising the appointment of the Commission President is bound to have repercussions on the 
whole institutional system. A more democratic selection procedure can increase the accountability and 
legitimacy of the Commission, as a whole as well as the decision-making procedures in which it is 
involved. It can also have substantial effects on the public perception of and the public involvement 
with the Union. What is more, the resulting politicisation of the position of the Commission President 
is likely to impact upon the roles of the Commission as a whole. In particular it may well affect the 
much-cherished political independence of the Commission (Franck, 2002). Finally, the relationship 
between the President and the rest of the Commission is likely to be affected.  
The Laeken Declaration (European Council, 2001) enumerates three ways of appointing the 
Commission President: by a qualified majority in the European Council, by the European Parliament  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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or through direct election by the citizens. Two other ways also merit consideration: election by the 
national parliaments or by a Congress of Parliamentarians. 
2.1  The situation under the Treaty of Amsterdam 
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission President was chosen unanimously by the national 
governments. The Maastricht Treaty made a first step towards a more democratic system: it granted 
the European Parliament the formal right to be consulted on the choice of the President.
3 The 
European Parliament took this provision to mean that it was entitled to approve or reject the nominee 
for president. Surprisingly, at the first occasion in 1994 this rather opportunistic interpretation was 
approved by the President-in-office of the Council (Germany). The Parliament’s interpretation was 
formalised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which explicitly gives the European Parliament the final 
approving vote on the European Council’s choice for Commission President. The other Commission 
Members are then nominated by the national governments by common accord with the nominee for 
President. Finally, the entire College is subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament.  
Democracy 
The consensus at the time was that the Amsterdam Treaty had pushed the EU further towards a 
parliamentary model of executive selection (Crombez, 1997; Nentwich and Falkner, 1997). Through 
the election of a legislature (the European Parliament), the EU citizens would also indirectly select the 
executive, i.e. the Commission and its President.  
However, this expectation was not fully borne out in practice. The presidential candidate nominated by 
the European Council is unlikely ever to be rejected by the European Parliament, as the European 
Council is able to impose its choice in the European Parliament vote (Hix, 1997; Gabel and Hix, 
2002). The governing parties that are part of the European Council press their MEPs to support the 
candidate nominated by the European Council, because a negative European Parliament vote would be 
seen as an embarrassment. The national parties are able to impose their choice on their MEPs, because 
they control MEP candidate selection. The coalition of MEPs stemming from national parties in the 
European Council plus those MEPs with the same political colour as the presidential candidate is 
almost always going to beat the coalition of those parties that are not in the European Council and 
have different policy preferences.  
Thus, voters’ choices in the European Parliament elections have an only limited impact on who 
becomes Commission President. The same holds for the composition of the entire college, which tends 
to reflect more the composition of the Council than that of the European Parliament.
4 
In turn, the marginal impact of the European Parliament (EP) elections has reduced their public 
appeal. For the time being, EP elections remain to be fought as a re-run of the national general election 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980): they are not fought on the competing agendas and by office-holders of 
Europe-wide parties, but on national issues and by national parties. Hence, the current system fails to 
exploit the public appeal of the President’s appointment and does not lead the way to a European 
public-political sphere.  
In the end, the selection of the Commission President remains under the firm control of the European 
Council. The actual decision-making process within the European Council continues to take place 
behind closed doors and remains largely opaque to the general public. 
 
                                                      
3 Still, the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration had already granted the European Parliament bureau a consultative 
role in the choice of the Commission President. 
4 This is exemplified by the composition of the Prodi Commission: only 5 of the 20 members of the college are 
close to the PPE, despite the fact that the PPE had become the largest group after the European Parliament 
elections. On the other hand, 10 of them are close to the PSE, the socialists being indeed the dominant fraction in 
the Council at the time.  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Institutional balance 
The current voting procedure in the European Council – consensus – guarantees that the preferences of 
every member state are taken into account. Thus, the mandate of the Commission President derives 
clearly from all the member states.  
Nevertheless, a good working relationship between the Commission and the European Council is not 
automatically ensured, also because the political composition of the Council changes during the term 
of the Commission President. Moreover, once in office the Commission President is not really 
accountable to the body that actually appoints him/her. While the European Council and the Council 
are well placed to make or break a Commission, they do not enjoy formal powers to sanction it. 
The European Parliament does enjoy the formal power to force the Commission to resign as a body. 
However, the exercise of this power is subject to exceptionally strict conditions, as is illustrated by the 
fact that none of the seven motions of censure ever submitted has carried (Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 
2002). Notably in the one case that the (Santer) Commission did resign, it did so on its own initiative 
before the European Parliament was able to mobilise its formal powers. The exercise of the censure by 
the European Parliament is further complicated by the fact that if it succeeds, it has only rather limited 
means to control what Commission will be nominated in its stead. 
One might argue that the high obstacles erected against the Commission being forced to resign serve 
to protect its independence. The question arises, however, whether this situation remains appropriate 
in the light of the (political) responsibilities the Commission has taken on or whether more effective 
controls (by both Council and European Parliament) are required. 
Efficacy 
The main problem of the consensual appointment of the Commission President is that it opens the 
door for capture by one member state (Hix, 2002a: 11). The 1994 Corfu European Council serves as a 
good example. At this occasion, the UK vetoed the candidacy of Belgian PM Dehaene and Germany 
vetoed the candidacy of Dutch PM Lubbers. It was only at a next meeting that the European Council 
agreed on the nomination of Jacques Santer.  
Thus, the consensus rule complicates the decision procedure within the European Council. In 
particular, it has the consequence that the eventual nominee may well be selected on the merit of not 
provoking a veto of any of the heads of state, rather than for being the best-qualified person for the 
job. Eventually, this way of proceeding reflects badly upon the nominee as well as on the European 
Council itself. 
The current situation leaves much to be desired in terms of democracy. As the selection process takes place 
under the firm control of the European Council, the impact of the electorate is marginal at best. What is more, 
the selection process is marked by opacity. The provisions on the selection and resignation of the Commission 
and its President protect the independence of the Commission. The question arises, however, whether the current 
responsibilities of the Commission do not require more effective controls. The efficacy of this selection 
procedure is hampered by the requirement of consensus in the European Council. As a consequence the eventual 
nominee may be selected mainly on the merit of not provoking a veto of any of the heads of state, rather than for 
being the best-qualified person for the job. 
2.2  The Treaty of Nice: Election by a majority in the European Council 
In the Nice Treaty (to enter into force on 1 February 2003), the EU governments have agreed to 
choose the Commission President by qualified majority voting (qmv) rather than by unanimity. As in 
the current situation, the European Parliament then has to approve the nominee.  
Efficacy 
The rationale behind the change at Nice is to improve the efficacy of the selection procedure. The 
nomination of a Commission President will no longer be compromised by the capture by one member 
state. At the same time, this reform reduces the possibility of making the choice of the Commission  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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President part of a package deal. The new provisions make it possible that several heads of state 
propose a candidate. As a more open process of competition will ensue, the merits of the candidates 
are more likely to be a decisive factor. Above all, however, with the new voting system of Nice and 
the increase to 25 member states, the selection procedure is bound to become rather more complex. 
While the move to qmv may thus have clear advantages, its implications in practice should not be 
overestimated. In many spheres in which the (European) Council can decide by qmv, actual decision-
making still takes place in the shadow of a putative consensus (Golub, 1999). If there is a vehement 
opposition by any (major) member state, it is unlikely that the majority will persist on a nomination. 
Democracy 
The move from unanimity to qmv also has implications in terms of democracy. On the negative side, 
qmv makes it possible that whole electorates are cut off from the selection of the Commission 
President. Furthermore, the nomination will still be decided behind closed doors.  
On the positive side, the move to qmv may well benefit the legitimacy of the decision in the Council. 
If member states indeed propose various candidates, there is likely to be a broad and substantial debate 
in the European Council on their merits and programmes. These debates may even spill over into the 
public sphere.  
Most notably from the perspective of democracy, the move to qmv in the European Council may allow 
the European Parliament to put a much stronger mark on the selection process. Member states that 
have found themselves in the minority in the European Council will no longer press their MEPs for a 
positive vote. As a result, whereas the nominee was unlikely ever to be rejected by the European 
Parliament under the unanimity provisions (Hix, 1997), moving to qmv in the European Council 
significantly increases the chances that the European Parliament can actually veto a candidate.
5 Thus it 
becomes far more likely that voters’ preferences expressed in the EP elections will actually come to 
bear upon the selection process. 
Institutional balance 
If the European Parliament can make itself more felt in the selection procedure, its role in the Union 
architecture will be much strengthened. It will increase its grip over the Commission, while at the 
same time contributing to the legitimacy the Commission enjoys. What is more, European party 
groups, especially the larger ones, may turn this power into a campaign issue in the EP elections by 
featuring a candidate for the Commission Presidency or opposing the President in office. 
As for the Council, decision-making by qmv creates the risk that the competition between the 
candidates may turn into a competition between member states. If the President would indeed be 
nominated against the will of some member states, this might well have a negative impact on his or 
her relationship with the (European) Council. Thus, regardless of whether the EP’s powers turn out to 
be increased, the Nice provisions lead to a politicisation of the appointment of the President, since it 
will be more difficult for ‘intergovernmental’ member states to refuse an integrationist candidate, or 
for left-wing member states to refuse a right-wing candidate, and vice versa. 
A central issue here is whether being elected by a qualified majority will in the end make the President 
more or less dependent on the Council. Some have argued that the Commission President may well 
come to depend on a structural majority in the Council. Decision-making within the Council would 
then come to be characterised by a new government-opposition dynamic. In the ‘governing’ majority 
                                                      
5 Consider for instance the Santer vote: of the 94 MEPs whose national party supported Santer and whose 
European Parliament party group opposed Santer, 47 voted with the national party. If the European Council is 
divided as a result of qmv, the national governing parties that are in the minority in the European Council will no 
longer press their MEPs for a positive vote. Hence, a larger number would vote with their European Parliament 
party group. If for instance in 1994 the Spanish Social Democrats would have been in a minority position in the 
European Council against the nomination of Santer, a negative vote of their 17 MEPs would have sufficed to 
shift the European Parliament majority against him.   C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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would be those member states that backed the Commission President and would probably also support 
his/her legislative initiatives. In the ‘opposing’ minority would be the member states that were on the 
losing side in the appointment of the President and could also be on the losing side on most legislative 
issues (Hix, 2002a).  
These predictions are probably overstated, however. In practice, coalitions among the member states 
shift according to the subject matter, with each member state having its own specific preferences on 
each topic. Moreover, given the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process (dual 
legislative) and the appointment procedure (investiture vote), a generalised government-opposition 
dynamic appears rather unlikely.  
The new Nice provisions facilitate a more effective selection procedure, although the actual impact may be 
relatively modest. More notably, however, they are likely to increase the power of the European Parliament in 
the selection procedure and thereby also the involvement of the electorate. Furthermore, qmv inevitably leads to 
a more politicised nomination vote in the European Council. While the changes will probably lead to a slight 
politicisation of the position of the Commission, the effects of these changes can be controlled by the checks 
member states exert upon each other and the role of the European Parliament.  
2.3  Election by the European Parliament 
While the involvement of the European Parliament in the selection procedure for the Commission 
President has gradually increased, its role remains secondary to that of the European Council. With a 
view towards democratising the selection procedure, it has been suggested that this division of roles 
might be reversed, making the European Parliament the prime actor in the selection procedure (Jospin, 
2001; Convention, 2002/177; Commission of the European Communities, 2002). Concretely, after the 
European elections, the European Parliament would elect the Commission President. 
If the European Parliament is to elect the Commission President, the nomination of candidates 
becomes a key issue. Obviously the boldest option would be that the European political parties 
indicate their candidate for President in the European elections (Jospin, 2001). These candidates might 
even compete as figureheads of their party’s transnational list (Barnier, 2001). A less far-reaching 
alternative would be that the European Council drafts a list of candidates,
6 from which the newly 
composed European Parliament would be required to choose a Commission President after the 
European elections.
7 Finally, it is also possible to have the national parliaments designate a number of 
candidates. This would amount to a sort of ‘primary’ at the national level (Attina, 1999).  
This model carries the risks that the contest for the Commission President will only take place in the 
(bigger) member as they are crucial to the eventual outcome and are, hence, also probably the 
homeland of the most likely candidates. Thus, (smaller) member states might be alienated from the 
process. However, this danger can be warded off by inserting a requirement that any candidate be able 
to demonstrate support from among at least two-thirds of the national delegations in the European 
Parliament (cf. Hix, 2002a). 
Democracy 
Having the European Parliament elect the Commission President will have profound effects on 
European democracy. Above all, the choices of European citizens in EP elections will come to have 
much more weight. This could boost the participation rate in EP elections. Since most Europeans are 
                                                      
6 Another possibility is a dual list, drawn up by the Council and the European Parliament (Lenaerts & Verhoeven 
2002). 
7 The EPP (2002) proposes to stick to the Nice provisions, whilst foreseeing that the European Council 
nominates the presidential candidate ‘in the light of the European Parliament elections’. This would probably 
amount to a genuine election by the European Parliament, since the Nice provisions (presumably) make it 
possible that the European Parliament refuses a candidate nominated by the European Council. Still, it is a 
somewhat awkward compromise, which does not really give the European Council its own say in the 
appointment of the President. It is also doubtful whether the public would fully comprehend this process.  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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well acquainted with this way of electing the executive, this proposal will also contribute to their 
understanding of the European political system. Moreover, by its very nature, the selection process 
will take place in public. In turn, this option is bound to enhance the public appeal of the Commission 
President. The debate on the merits of the candidates would probably combine with a much wider 
debate on programmatic issues, as the euro-parties will present their election programmes at the same 
time. All this could in turn foster the emergence of a European political constituency. 
Of course, in the medium run, EP elections are unlikely to fully ward off the shadow of national 
politics. National parties will still have an incentive to use the elections in their wider pursuit of 
national government office. Voters could still use these elections to signal their national concerns to 
the governing parties by voting for opposition or protest parties. Still, in the long run, the European 
dimension of EP elections is likely to be strengthened. (See Hix, 2002a, for a sceptical assessment of 
this view.) 
Giving the European Parliament the primacy in the nomination process may still fail to transfer the 
effective power of appointment, as parties in national government might still be tempted to impose 
their wishes on their MEPs. Hence, additional measures may be needed to ensure that EP party groups 
exercise a genuine choice over the candidates. In particular, the bond between domestic parties and 
MEPs should be loosened. This could be done by transferring the legal responsibility for selecting 
candidates in EP elections to other bodies, such as EP party groups, and/or regional party 
organisations.  
This proposal will further strengthen the role of EP party groups. It stimulates them to organise around 
blocs each seeking to mobilise a majority for its own candidate (Franck, 2002). At the same time, the 
heterogeneity of Europe is unlikely to be fully absorbed in two major political blocs, especially not as 
long as there remains a strong proportional element in the electoral procedures. Thus, the largest party 
in the European Parliament will not necessarily be able to secure its candidate for Commission 
President, as the final outcome will depend on the coalitions that can be formed.  
Institutional balance 
The position of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Commission in this model deserves careful 
attention. On the positive side, one may argue that it is logical to boost the role of the European 
Parliament in the appointment of the Commission President, as it is the only institution that can 
effectively sanction the Commission (Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002). On the negative side, however, 
there is the risk that this model may in fact reduce the powers of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the 
Commission, relegating it to a mere rubber-stamping body (cf. Hix, 2002b). Experience with national 
parliamentary systems has taught us that executives selected by a parliamentary majority may well 
turn this majority into its will-less servant. If the Commission becomes an emanation of a 
parliamentary majority, the European Parliament risks losing its ‘critical distance’, which now enables 
it to effectively exercise its supervisory role.  
To counter this, some have proposed the requirement that the Commission President must be elected 
by a super-majority in the European Parliament (Lamoureux et al., 2002). But this option opens up the 
possibility of a deadlock in case the two biggest groups are unable to agree on a candidate. Such a 
situation would turn the selection of the Commission President again into an easy prey for dirty and 
opaque horse-trading between the political families. 
In any case, it remains to be seen whether the Commission would really be able to bring about such a 
‘dictatorship of the executive’. This risk is mitigated by the fact that the executive would have to rely 
on a coalition of party groups that, given the under-development of European party-groups, are 
unlikely to be fully controllable all the time. Moreover, the election of the Commission President by 
the European Parliament does not amount to the election of the whole Commission by the European 
Parliament. One might well leave the power to nominate the other Commissioners to the member 
states. Furthermore, experience so far has shown that MEPs tend to interpret parliamentary 
mechanisms in such a way as to make them compatible with the non-majoritarian features of the EU. 
Technocratic and judicial scrutiny tends to superimpose ideological differences (Magnette, 2001a).  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Finally, the central role of the Council in the Union’s decision-making process should be underlined. 
Since the Council is part of the executive and part of the legislature, a fully ‘fused-majorities’ model is 
unlikely. 
This brings us to the implications this model has for the Council. As the member states lose their 
control of the selection process, there is the risk that certain member governments become alienated 
from the Commission President, especially if he/she maintains a very close relationship with a 
parliamentary group in which certain states are less well represented. If the group of alienated member 
governments would turn out to be sufficiently large, the danger of inter-institutional deadlock looms. 
To ensure a good working relationship between the Commission President and the Council as a whole, 
various measures can be envisaged. First, it appears desirable that, after the EP elections, the 
Commission President is also approved by a qualified majority in the European Council. Further, 
member states opposing the President chosen may be satisfied through a balanced overall composition 
of the Commission itself, which they can assure through their right of nomination. More far-reaching 
possibilities are even conceivable. The Council can, for instance, be granted the right to censure the 
Commission (Commission of the European Communities, 2002; Dehousse, 1995).
8 One risk of this, 
however, is that the Commission members fall victim to inter-state feuds. For that reason, individual 
accountability of the Commissioners vis-à-vis the Council is not desirable, but a collective 
accountability or, alternatively, focusing the accountability relationship on the position of the 
Commission President alone, may be possible. A further option is to give the Council the power to 
dissolve the European Parliament if the latter censures the Commission. 
All in all, one can envisage several institutional measures to ensure a good working relationship 
between the Council and the Commission. Indeed, whatever flanking measures are adopted, care has 
to be taken that they do not overshoot this objective by actually compromising the position of the 
Commission and tilting the institutional balance again to the side of the member states.  
Efficacy 
There is some reason for concern with this model about how the changed relationship with the Council 
may affect the coordinating powers of the President. In terms of his remit, the Commission President 
gains little from a further strengthening of his bonds with the European Parliament. On the other hand, 
the loosening of ties with the (European) Council might lead to a reduction of the trust member states 
are willing to put in the Commission. Member states may be reluctant to delegate powers to an office 
that they are not sure they can control. If member states will become more guarded in their relations 
with the Commission President, his/her capacity to coordinate across the institutions is likely to be 
reduced.  
There is reason to believe that this model will work towards the selection of candidates of high quality. 
European party groups will have a big interest in nominating well qualified candidates. MEPs can, 
moreover, be regarded as an expert constituency at the heart of the Union’s decision-making process 
(Laver et al., 1995).  
Election of the Commission President by the European Parliament will have profound democratising effects. Its 
impact on the institutional balance requires attention both on the side of the European Parliament and of the 
Council. Whenever genuine dangers are apparent, however, flanking measures can be adopted to thwart them. 
Preserving a balanced relationship with the Council is also a precondition for this option to be efficacious. 
                                                      
8 Note that the Treaty already provides the possibility for the Council to ask the European Court of Justice to 
retire a Commissioner if (s)he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his/her duties or if 
(s)he has been guilty of serious misconduct (Art. 213 TEC).  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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2.4  Election by the national parliaments 
Beyond the options of having the Commission President elected either by the European Council or by 
the European Parliament, a third option may be to delegate the election to national parliaments. It has 
been argued that this option meets various needs at the same time (Hix, 2002a): 
-  it offers a democratic procedure for electing the Commission President; 
-  it circumvents the playing off of the European Council and the European Parliament; and 
-  it secures a substantial role for national parliaments in the European political process.  
The election of the Commission President by the national parliaments would be organised as an 
Electoral College. Each national parliament would have a certain number of ‘electoral college votes’ 
equal to its country’s representation in the European Parliament (thereby allowing some over-
representation of smaller member states). These votes could then be allocated to the different 
presidential candidates in proportion to their share in the ballot of each parliament. The candidate 
obtaining the absolute majority of the votes (if necessary after two ballots) would be appointed 
Commission President.  
A major advantage of this model is that it can be structured to ensure a transnational outcome of the 
election. Each candidate for the post of Commission President would be required to secure at least a 
certain level of support in most/all national parliaments. Thus it would ensure that the Commission 
President would enjoy the support of party groups throughout all member states, instead of coming 
under the director of a limited number of member states.  
Another notable feature of this option is that it might leave member states the freedom to move to a 
system in which their share in the electoral college is determined through direct elections by the 
people rather than by the national parliaments (Hix, 2002a). If eventually all member states would 
make this move, the system would be transformed into a direct election of the Commission President 
(see section 2.6). 
Democracy 
This proposal derives its strength from the fact that it draws upon the national parliaments, ‘the main 
democratic and sovereign bodies in Europe’s representative democracies’ (Hix, 2002a). The proposal 
can also draw upon the national public infrastructure to foster debates about what the EU should be 
doing. At the same time, it would bring out the truly European dimension of the election, since 
candidates would have to campaign throughout the EU. As a consequence, the proposal would 
probably go some way towards strengthening the role of Euro-parties, but not to the same extent as in 
the previous proposal. 
Admittedly, this option involves somewhat more complex arithmetic than some of the other options 
(Hoffmann, 2002: 9). Still, these complexities do not appear prohibitive in the case of the election of 
the US President. What matters is that, contrary to the current selection by the European Council, the 
election takes place openly in a way that is controllable to the public. 
A limitation of this model, however, is that while it does involve the national parliaments, it does not 
offer much reason to expect this involvement to spill over to the electorate. Especially when the 
national election and the election of the Commission President may well be quite far apart in time, the 
choice of the new Commission President is unlikely to feature high among the issues at stake in the 
national elections. In that way, this option institutionalises the second-order national character of the 
investiture procedure, as the election for the institutions deciding the investiture procedure (i.e. the 
national Parliaments) are a-fortiori national-centred. Moreover, rather than sparking off a truly 
European political debate, election by national parliaments is more likely to stir up different national 
debates that will be centred around national issues (e.g. the Euro in the UK) and dominated by national 
party politics (Hoffmann, 2002). 
Hence, though the idea of involving national parliaments does have a definite appeal, it has limited 
democratic credentials as it will not bring about much involvement of the citizenry. Nor can this  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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option be expected to contribute towards the structural formation of a European political and public 
sphere. On the contrary, it reaffirms the primacy of national public spheres. 
Institutional balance 
As this option secures a substantial role for national parliaments within the Union architecture, it may 
well serve to rally a stronger engagement of national parliaments with the European project. 
Moreover, the appointment by national parliaments provides the EU executive with a distinct base of 
democratic legitimacy. In that way, the ‘fusion’ of the executive and the legislative is avoided.  
Quite likely, the candidate gaining the majority of support from the national parliaments will be able 
to enjoy considerable support in the European Council, as the composition of the latter reflects the 
composition of national parliaments. This does not, however, make this option equivalent to selection 
by (the majority of) the European Council (contra Hoffmann, 2002: 11-12). Any successful candidate 
for Commission President will probably require the support of at least some opposition parties in 
national parliaments as well some small governing parties with a political colour that is not present in 
the European Council (e.g. the Greens). In any case, the fact that any successful candidate is likely to 
enjoy considerable support in the European Council is noteworthy, in that it provides an important 
source of inter-institutional stability.  
Much more reason for concern comes from the relationship between the Commission President thus 
chosen and the European Parliament. Since the legitimacy of the President would derive from the 
national parliaments, he/she would be much less dependent on the support of the European Parliament. 
On the positive side, it could be argued that this guarantees the independence of both the Commission 
and the European Parliament. On the negative side, as the European Parliament’s powers to influence 
the appointment of the Commission President are reduced, it may be more inclined to veto legislative 
proposals or to threaten to invoke censure. Moreover, the risk of institutional deadlock looms, as the 
majority in the European Parliament will not necessarily be the same as the aggregated majority in the 
national parliaments (and thus the Council). Thus overall this option seems to strengthen the role of 
the Council in the appointment of the Commission President, to the detriment of the role of the 
European Parliament. 
Efficacy 
If the Commission President were elected according to this method, he or she would come to claim an 
independent position with a distinct basis of legitimacy. Notably, however, there would be few 
mechanisms of accountability to constrain this independence. Already the election of the Commission 
President itself would not provide for accountability, as the composition of the electing body would 
not be determined by the performance of the President in office. Moreover, in between elections, 
his/her actions would only to a limited extent be subject to scrutiny (Hoffmann, 2002). Given their 
position in the multi-level system, national parliaments lack the resources and access needed to 
effectively monitor the European level (Dann, 2002). And even if they would command these 
resources, they would still lack the means to sanction the Commission President.  
Hence, the President thus chosen might well skirt the Council and the European Parliament, invoking 
his/her accountability to the national parliaments, which would however be unlikely to join powers 
effectively. This political independence is all too likely to turn against the Commission President. 
Powers are likely to be withheld on grounds that the position is insufficiently embedded in the Union 
architecture. 
The option of having the Commission President elected by the national parliaments scores badly on all three 
accounts. It falls short in terms of democracy as it fails to involve the electorate and reaffirms the primacy of 
national public spheres. While it may work out well with the member governments in the Council, it troubles the 
relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament. In the end, however, in the absence of 
accountability mechanisms, one may well wonder whether the Council and the European Parliament will 
actually be willing to entrust the Commission President thus chosen with any substantial powers.  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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2.5  Election by a Congress of Parliamentarians 
Another option that has been gaining interest lately is to delegate the task of electing the Commission 
President to a Congress of Parliamentarians. This Congress would be a newly established European 
institution bringing together national parliamentarians from all member states with an equal number of 
Members of the European Parliament.
9 As the Congress would be a new institution, its composition 
and working procedures would have to be decided up front. 
Conceivably, the Congress might elect the Commission President by simple majority. However, to 
ensure that the successful candidate enjoys broad support, more demanding voting rules could be 
adopted. One might, for instance, require the winning candidate to enjoy the support of a majority 
among the EP representatives as well as among a majority of the member state representatives, or even 
of the majority in a majority of national parliaments. 
Democracy 
At first sight, the idea of a Congress is appealing. It would be the representatives of the European 
citizens, in their capacity as both national citizens and European citizens, who would elect the 
President of the Commission.
10 Thus, one might hope that election by a Congress would combine the 
best of both former options (election by the European Parliament and by national parliaments).  
A Congress is likely to stimulate the development of links between national parties and European 
party groups and will thus contribute to the development of a European political sphere. It would bring 
the election of the Commission President out into the open. Also, a Congress may well acquire a 
strong symbolic appeal across the European public spheres. 
In practice, however, it appears more likely that the Congress will above all combine some of the 
problems attached to the former options. The idea of a Congress does little to involve the electorate 
directly. The fact that the EP elections will only partially determine who shall become Commission 
President will only have a slight effect on their public appeal. At the same time, the choice of the 
Commission President is unlikely to become a major issue in national elections amidst the national 
issues that are normally at stake. 
Moreover, the fact that the Congress does not have an established place within the Union architecture 
is bound to leave it somewhat of a fremdkörper in the eyes of the public. Indeed, rather than 
exemplifying European democratic practice, this new and incidental institution might well be captured 
by established political forces behind the scenes (national governments, party-groups).  
Institutional balance 
Given the composition of the Congress, this option does not seem to favour either the Council or the 
European Parliament to the detriment of the other. As with the election by national parliaments, it is 
rather likely that the majority by which the Commission President has been elected will be of a similar 
political persuasion as the majority in the Council. At the same time, working relations with the 
European Parliament will be somewhat better than in the former option, as MEPs will have been part 
of the Congress.  
Having an equal number of national MPs and MEPs is obviously crucial in this respect. However, 
much will also depend on the political colour of the members that represent the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments in the Congress. If the rules of designation of Congress members are such 
that only the dominant political tendencies in both constituents are being represented in the Congress, 
then divergence between the Congress and the European Parliament is more likely to emerge. 
 
                                                      
9 Some French proposals suggest, however, a division of 2/3 national MPs and 1/3 MEPs. 
10 We owe this interpretation to Prof. Dr. Koen Lenaerts.  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Efficacy 
While the Commission President elected by a Congress may be able to establish effective working 
relations with the European Parliament and the Council, the question of accountability remains 
troublesome. If the Congress is to reassure on this score, it should be given the necessary powers 
(information, questions, and censure). Still, it will only be able to exercise them on the rare occasions 
when it does congregate. In between elections, it would fall to the European Parliament to scrutinise 
the Commission. However, there is an obvious tension between the role of the Congress and that of 
the European Parliament. Any extension of the powers the Congress enjoys in holding the 
Commission accountable would undermine the powers of the European Parliament in the same 
domain. This problem is not resolved by the fact that a substantial part of the Congress would be 
constituted by MEPs. Overall, a Congress would add a significant number of complications to an 
already ‘Byzantine’ system. 
The democratic credentials of having the Commission President elected by a Congress of Parliamentarians 
appear eventually rather spurious. Compared to the alternative of election by national parliaments, the 
establishment of a Congress would better preserve the institutional balance. Still, the option creates a potential 
tension between the Congress and the European Parliament and leaves clear problems of Commission 
accountability that may well impede its efficacy. 
2.6  Direct election 
In the final option, the Commission President would be directly elected by EU citizens in an EU-wide 
contest without any parliamentary mediation (Fischer, 2000b; Verhofstadt, 2000). Thus, the EU would 
be transformed into a (partial
11) presidential system.  
Various voting procedures can be considered to organise such a direct election. The leading 
consideration should be that any candidate chosen will need to command wide support across the 
Union in order to preclude the threat of a permanent alienation of certain minorities and/or member 
states from executive power (cf. Laver et al., 1995). Thus a candidate should not be able to win by 
gathering support in a limited number of member states only.  
A first way to ensure broad support throughout the Union is to require any winner to collect an 
absolute majority of the votes cast. If in a first round no candidate would succeed in gathering such a 
majority, a second round may be organised along the lines of the French electoral system with a run-
off between the two most successful candidates.  
Alternatively (or additionally), votes from the various member states can be assigned weights, for 
instance according to each member state’s share in the European Parliament. Hence, votes cast by 
electors from smaller member states would weigh more than votes cast by electors from bigger 
member states. This could ensure that the preferences of the voters in smaller member states are also 
taken into account. An objection against this solution, however, is that it runs rather blatantly against 
the ‘one man–one vote’ principle.  
A third alternative is an electoral-college type of arrangement, modelled on the US presidential 
elections but with virtual rather than genuine electors (Laver et al., 1995). In this system voters would 
determine the allocation of ‘presidential mandates’. To favour smaller member states, each member 
state could have a number of presidential mandates (roughly) equal to its representation in the 
European Parliament. Furthermore, contrary to the practice of most American states, the distribution 
of presidential mandates per member state should not be awarded on a winner-takes-all basis, but 
rather on a proportional basis. The candidate who would then receive the majority of presidential 
mandates would become Commission President. The main advantage of this method is that it makes it 
possible to take into account the population weights of the member states, whilst highlighting the 
                                                      
11 Partial, because part of the executive powers in the Union would still lie in the hands of the Council and the 
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number of mandates the various candidates win in each member state rather than blatantly according 
different weights to ‘raw’ votes. 
Further guarantees to ensure that the eventual winner will indeed draw upon a wide basis of support 
may be derived from the organisation of the nomination procedure. Each candidate might, for 
instance, have to demonstrate the support of a certain percentage of MPs in a certain number of 
Parliaments (Laver et al., 1995). This would guarantee that one section of the elite in every member 
state would be accountable to their electorates for the actions of the winning candidate. 
By combining these various provisions, candidates can be prevented from ‘hunting where the largest 
ducks nest’. 
Democracy 
Direct election of the Commission President has obvious democratic merits. It directly involves the 
European citizens in the selection of the executive and its basic design stands out in terms of 
simplicity and transparency (although this may vary depending on the finer details of the election 
procedure). Potentially, the public appeal of this option is high. Voters in some member states are also 
already acquainted with direct presidential elections (France, Ireland, Finland, and Austria). 
However, one may dispute whether Europe’s voters are ready and interested to vote in such an 
election. Moreover, language barriers may make it difficult for the nominees to get their message 
across. With an immature electorate, this kind of election might end up as a ‘Eurovision contest’ with 
voters preferring the candidate of the same nationality or the one of a ‘friend’ country. 
Still, we should not underestimate the electorate. Once this option is introduced, one might expect the 
public to pick up on it and to acquire a concrete sense of what it is voting for. Thus, the visibility and 
accountability of the Commission President would be much strengthened. At the same time, one 
would expect electoral turn-outs to reach levels comparable to those of national elections, as this 
method makes it very clear to the citizens that their vote matters. (Hix, 2002b, is sceptical.) 
A crucial element for this option to work would be the evolution of a European political system with 
truly transnational party groups. Close collaboration between the national member organisations of the 
European party groups in a broad campaign, based upon a common manifesto, would be essential for 
winning the election. In turn, it would be much harder for national parties to turn the EP elections into 
a mid-term ‘beauty contest’ for national governments. The election campaign would engage European 
public opinion around unequivocally European issues. 
Institutional balance 
For this option to succeed, proper working arrangements need to be put in place between the 
Commission President and the two legislative bodies, the Council and the European Parliament. As 
regards the relationship with the European Parliament, the Commission President would naturally be 
linked to one or more party groups. Still, these relations would be considerably weaker than if they 
would have elected him or her. Indeed, the President will be less constrained by party affiliation, and 
may be able to rely on varying coalitions.  
Relations with the Council and the European Council might well be more complex. Of all options 
reviewed, a directly elected President may pose the strongest challenge to the primacy of the member 
states in the Union architecture. Quite likely, there would be some member governments of the same 
political persuasion as the Commission President, but there would be no guarantee that he or she 
would be able to rely on a majority of them. In the end, much would depend on personal skills whether 
the Council would be willing to accept the Commission President as a useful partner or rather take a 
more envious stance towards this newcomer. 
All in all, a directly elected Commission President is bound to put a lot of pressure on the institutional 
balance. It leaves the risk of institutional deadlock, so familiar from the French (‘cohabitation’) and 
US system (cf. Sartori, 1994; Linz, 1990; Duverger, 1980). To avoid this risk, release mechanisms 
may need to be put into place so that either legislative chamber would be able to force the Commission  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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President to resign. Conversely, one might also consider giving the Commission President the power 
to call for new EP elections. However, the use of such release mechanisms is bound to have its costs in 
terms of political stability. 
Efficacy 
Potentially this option invests the Commission President with a lot of power. Being directly elected by 
all European people, he or she will acquire an exceptionally strong mandate. The popular investiture 
will boost his/her authority vis-à-vis national leaders and the other EU institutions as well as abroad. 
Moreover, this option provides for a direct link of accountability, as the voters would now be able to 
‘throw out the scoundrels’.  
In turn, however, this puts the President of the Commission under a lot of political pressure. Whether 
she or he can deliver will depend heavily on the willingness of member states to actually entrust the 
President with substantial powers and to develop a productive working relationship with that 
individual. Indeed, if the high expectations of the electorate fail to be met, a backlash may occur in 
terms of public credibility and overall legitimacy of the system. Experience in national political 
systems has taught us that a presidential system is unlikely to bring political stability to a polity still 
lacking in social stability (Linz, 1990). Hence, it is essential that the democratic legitimacy entrusted 
to this office is matched by the actual powers it commands. 
Direct election of the Commission President is appealing for a number of democratic considerations. One may 
dispute, however, whether the European electorate is actually ready for it. The radical character of this proposal 
is bound to put a lot of pressure on the institutional balance, the implications of which are hard to predict. The 
Commission President, Council and European Parliament would have to redefine their working relationships. 
These will also determine whether this option can actually be made to work effectively. If the Council and the 
European Parliament would fail to cooperate constructively with the Commission President, it is likely that the 
Union’s credentials would be undermined. 
2.7  Preliminary conclusions on the selection of the Commission President 
The first notable finding of this chapter is that the selection procedure of the Commission President as 
revised by the Treaty of Nice goes a long way towards satisfying the three criteria of democracy, 
efficacy and institutional balance. The move away from consensus to qualified majority voting allows 
a whole new political dynamic to unfold within the European Council, and boosts the role the 
European Parliament can play in the appointment procedure. Even under Nice, there will therefore be 
a more politicised appointment of the Commission President. Thus, the Nice procedures may in the 
end differ in little but formal proceedings from the election of the Commission President by the 
European Parliament. 
Still, a move towards election by the European Parliament remains preferable from the perspective of 
democracy, because it would make the process more comprehensible and increases the likelihood that 
European party groups will actually free themselves from the control of national party organisations. 
As a result, the EP elections would become the core event for the appointment of the Commission 
President. The implementation of this option needs to be complemented by flanking measures that 
would ensure the full and equal involvement of the Council in the Union’s political process. With such 
measures in place and given the heterogeneous nature of the Union, there is little reason to fear the 
Commission developing into a dominating executive, as some (Laver et al., 1995; Hix, 2002a) have 
argued.  
Direct election of the Commission President by the electorate would be an even more radical step 
towards democratisation. However, the democratic gains of this procedure need to be qualified given 
the as yet only nascent European public space and the necessity to calibrate such an election. Also the 
turn to a Presidential political system that this reform would imply would severely shake up the 
institutional balance, exposing the Union on the one hand to the risk of too strong a Commission 
President and, on the other, to a structural deadlock between the Commission, Council and European 
Parliament.  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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Finally, two options involving the national parliaments were considered. In the first of these, the 
national parliaments would actually act as an electoral college. This option was found to be 
problematic on all accounts: it offered few democratic merits, distorted the institutional balance and 
was unlikely to contribute to greater Union efficacy. Election by a Congress of Parliamentarians did 
slightly better, but the gains for the Union of the involvement of national parliamentarians in a 
Congress were found nevertheless to be slight while raising considerable complications in the balance 
between the Commission, Council and European Parliament. 
Table 2. Six options for selecting the Commission President 
 Amsterdam  Nice  EP  election  National 
parliaments 
Congress Direct 
election 
Efficacy -  +  +  -  ±  ± 
Democracy -  ±  + - - + 
Institutional  balance  ±  ± ± ± ± ± 
 
Whichever way the Commission President is selected, it is bound to have implications for the nature 
of the Commission. In section 1 we noted that the scope and the nature of the Commission’s tasks 
have expanded over time. As a consequence, the image of the Commission as a technocratic, impartial 
broker simply can no longer be maintained (Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002: Part 2; Føllesdal, 2003). 
The Commission has become politicised over time and if it is to retain any political prominence in the 
future EU it will be politicised even more.  
At the same time, recognising the Commission as a political body does not necessary imply that it has 
to relinquish its role as guardian of the general European interest. Governmental institutions in 
national democratic systems are also expected to pursue the general interest rather than merely the 
interests of the electoral majority. Checks and balances can help to secure this orientation towards the 
general interest. Parliaments, especially when made up of different chambers, actually act as a buffer 
by checking executive action. Constitutions serve to delineate the remit of government and courts may 
act as their custodians.  
Regardless of the selection procedure chosen, we need to assess the position of the President of the 
Commission in the wider context in which his/her powers are subject to countervailing measures. On 
the one hand, the powers of the President within the Commission should be strengthened, so as to 
enable the President to exercise genuine leadership. As the selection process bestows more legitimacy 
on the Commission President, her or his powers in the nomination and resignation of Commissioners 
should increase.  
On the other hand, the politicising effect from the election of the Commission President should be 
countered by a balanced composition of the Commission, in terms of party affiliation and nationality. 
Thus, while the composition of the College of Commissioners should be the prime responsibility of 
the President, this power might be subject to certain minimum requirements regarding geographical 
and demographic diversity and fair rotation
12 and, possibly, to approval by the European Council and 
the European Parliament. Moreover, some of the quasi-judicial functions may be delegated to 
independent agencies (Majone, 1996). Thus, the Commission should continue to be able to perform its 
conciliatory role in the legislative process.  
Still, the Commission’s powers currently find their limits in the fields of cooperation that remain 
firmly in the hands of the member states. Whether a democratised Commission President will actually 
be in a position to give effective leadership to the Union thus depends on the overall organisation of 
executive leadership in the Union. With this caveat in mind, we next turn to the future of the Council 
Presidency as well. 
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3.  Towards an EU President 
Over the last couple of years there has been ever more debate on the issue of leadership of the Union 
and, in particular, on the Presidency of the Council. For many it has become clear that the rotating 
Presidency in its current form cannot be maintained, as it has become too much of a burden to bear for 
national governments and its discontinuity gives rise to serious problems (see section 1.1). Notably, 
the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 not only raised the question of the election of the 
Commission President, but also asked whether the six-monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Union 
can be maintained.  
There are basically two directions in which the executive responsibilities that are currently held by the 
rotating Presidency can be shifted. First, one might delegate them to the Commission. Secondly, one 
might draw on the model of the HR and seek to shift them to a permanent person in the Council.  
The latter option has received much attention lately with the proposal to replace the rotating 
Presidency by a permanent ‘President of the EU’ chosen by the European Council from among its 
former members. In turn the governments of the larger member states of France (Chirac, 2002), United 
Kingdom (Hain, 2002), Spain (Aznar, 2002) and Italy have expressed their support for this idea. 
Notably also Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the President of the Convention on the Future of the EU, has 
commented favourably on this proposal (Vif-L’Express, 31 May 2002). 
The question of an EU president is bound to become crucial in determining the centre of gravity in the 
Union. As such, the issue of EU leadership has become the focal point of the ongoing struggle 
between ‘intergovernmentalists’ and ‘supranationalists’, pitting against each other the alternatives of 
either a long-term Council President firmly under the control of the member governments or a 
Commission President protecting the Union’s interest under the direction of the European Parliament.  
In actual fact, however, the options are more nuanced and also less simple than these two suggest. To 
properly assess proposals for an EU President, we need to look at the broader picture taking into 
account all executive responsibilities and their interplay. In addition to the role and selection of the EU 
President, there are at least three other elements that any re-organisation of the Union’s executive 
needs to define: 
1.  Where are the powers of agenda-setting and initiative located? Will a future President acquire 
such powers? Is there a shift in their current allocation between the Commission and the member 
states?  
2.  How are the Union’s external responsibilities organised? Should the post of HR be transformed 
into that of a ‘Foreign Secretary of the Union’? If so, what then would be its relationship with the 
Commission and with a possible President? 
3.  What is the future organisation of the European administrations, in particular the relationship 
between the Secretariat supporting the Council and the Commission Directorates-General? Should 
they be fused, or should the current duality (with the corresponding coordination problems) be 
maintained? 
The answer to these questions will have a great bearing on the efficacy of the leadership. Indeed, the 
current lack of leadership is not only due to the duality of a constrained Commission President and a 
rotating Council Presidency, but also to the dispersion of the powers of initiative and agenda-setting. 
Moreover, the efficacy deficit can also be explained by the scattering of external responsibilities, the 
duality of administrations and the requirement of unanimity. These factors in particular have had a 
great bearing upon the disappointing political achievements in the second and the third pillar.  
The question of the Presidency and these factors can be combined in an infinite number of ways. We 
focus in our analysis, however, on four basic models that have a strong internal consistency and that 
define the main alternatives in our view. They can be considered ‘ideal-types’, i.e. theoretical 
constructs that allow us to pinpoint the impact of the different constituent elements.  
First, we explore the two directions suggested above: on the one hand the possibility of appointing a 
long-term President of the European Council who would then function alongside the Commission  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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President, and on the other hand the option of retaining the rotating Presidency by relocating tasks 
between it and the Commission.  
However, picking up on suggestions that have gradually made their way into the debate in the 
Convention on the Future of the EU, there are two more options we want to explore. These models 
move beyond the European Council-Commission duality by merging the Presidency of both 
institutions. Such a ‘unified presidential model’ would be a radical reform of the present situation and 
its implications may be very different depending also on the accompanying reforms. We analyse two 
major variations: one in which the unified President is ultimately appointed by the member 
governments and a second, democratised model in which her or his mandate derives (directly or 
indirectly) from the European electorate as a whole. 
3.1  Present situation 
In section 1, we described the current organisation of leadership in the Union. Basically, it is defined 
by three positions: 
-  a Presidency of the (European) Council, exercised by each member government in turn, which has 
come to include many more responsibilities than the mere chairing of meetings; 
-  a High Representative who formally assists the Presidency in CFSP and in practice acts as the 
day-to-day contact point of the Union in the world; 
-  a Commission President who, as the primus inter pares among the Commissioners, is in charge of 
the day-to-day management of the Union, but whose powers are constrained by the limits to the 
Commission’s remit. 
This division of tasks has evolved for various reasons and has obvious merits. At this current stage of 
European cooperation, however, it gives rise to some fundamental problems. 
Institutional balance 
Its incremental transformations notwithstanding, the current system still embodies the tenacious 
institutional balance that is so characteristic of EU politics. The rotating Presidency ensures that no 
single member state can exert a long-term determining influence on the (European) Council. 
Regardless of size, each member state enjoys an equal share in the Presidency of the Union.  
In this way, the current organisation prevents the Presidency from developing into a genuinely 
political body. Often the Presidency plays a key role in Council negotiations by forging the required 
compromises.  
For national ministries and civil services, holding the Presidency also entails a learning effect, 
allowing the build-up of valuable EU experience. Thus, the Presidency creates a sense of ownership 
of, and responsibility towards the EU. This advantage may, however, be eliminated by the longer 
intervals between Presidencies after enlargement.  
At times, relations between the Presidency and the Commission and its President have been strained. 
Overall, however, the balance that has been attained in the coordination of roles between the 
Presidency and the Commission is remarkable. Fundamental to this is probably the common 
understanding that, while the Presidency may rule the day, the Commission is bound to stay.  
Similarly, the High Representative has been able to carve out his own niche within this balance by 
carefully negotiating his mandate with the Council as well as seeking close coordination with the 
Commission (in particular the Commissioner responsible for External Affairs). 
Efficacy of office  
As long as its role merely concerned the chairmanship of meetings, the rotating Presidency functioned 
well. However, the ongoing deepening (especially CFSP) and widening of the Union have greatly  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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increased the burden of the Presidency. Today, the rotating Presidency does not deliver the effective 
leadership the Union needs.  
As has been observed by the Secretary-General of the Council, the Presidency rotation has turned into 
a source of instability and discontinuity (Council of the EU, 2002). First, each Presidency establishes 
its own priorities, which do not always fit neatly in the EU agenda, whilst the follow-up of decisions 
taken under previous presidencies is often insufficient. Second, as a result of the change-over process, 
there is not enough time to master the details of the many EU files and the different governmental 
positions. Third, the quality of the presidencies varies. These shortcomings may increase after 
enlargement, as the burden of holding the Presidency will become heavier and the capacity of the new 
member states to assume this burden is in doubt. 
The problems of the rotating Presidency are most apparent in the Union’s external presence (Everts, 
2002). The continuity of the CFSP is impaired, as each presiding country’s pet topics are brought to 
the forefront, whilst the term of the Presidency is too short to allow the required personal relations to 
be established with the main global players. It also leads to poor external communication. For 
example, during the Swedish Presidency, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh wanted to talk to Colin 
Powell, only to be told that he was already on the line with Solana. She offered to hold the line, only to 
learn that Relex Commissioner Patten was already holding (Everts, 2002). The rotating Presidency 
may, moreover, impair the external credibility of the CFSP, especially when a small or neutral 
member state assumes the office. The creation of the post of HR has gone some way to remedy the 
shortcomings in this field, but it has also added new complications given the substantial overlap 
between the functions and responsibilities of the HR and the Relex Commissioner.  
The Commission President cannot fill this ‘leadership gap’, as the member states have carefully 
limited the Commission’s involvement in several domains and (ever since Delors) no Commission 
President has commanded the authority inside and outside the Union to credibly take up this role.  
Democracy 
The current organisation of leadership can hardly be considered democratic as electoral choice only 
plays a role in the appointment of the Commission President and, arguably, its impact remains 
marginal even there. Taking a broader perspective, however, one may well ascribe a number of 
democratic virtues to the current organisation of the Council Presidency. For a start, it may be 
assumed that any member government that comes to hold it enjoys solid democratic legitimacy at 
home. In that way, the electoral choice of citizens does matter in the current system, in that their 
national leaders each get a chance to head the EU for a certain period of time. 
What is more, the rotating Presidency does have an impact on the engagement of the national citizenry 
of which ever member state its turn it is. The Presidency literally brings the Union closer to the 
national public and its press. The increased media coverage has also been recognised to have its 
downsides, however. It may stimulate over-dramatisation and create pressure to produce results to the 
detriment of the quality of proceedings (Council of the EU, 2002).  
After enlargement, the effects of the Presidency on the national public sphere will become much rarer, 
as the interval period between holding the Presidency will increase. The decision to transfer all future 
European Council meetings to Brussels is bound to reduce its effects further. 
The current organisation of the Council Presidency is firmly embedded in the Union’s institutional balance. 
However, the system has become ever more inefficient, especially in terms of external presence. It is not without 
democratic merits, but these remain rather limited and indirect. Enlargement will increase the current inefficacy, 
whilst reducing the advantages in terms of institutional balance and democracy. 
3.2  Pseudo semi-presidentialism 
Discontent with the rotating Council Presidency has led to proposals to replace it by a permanent 
President of the European Council. In that way, Europe would be incarnated by a person, and no 
longer by a member state. Assigning the permanent Presidency to an incumbent head of government of  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
 23 
one member state would distort the balance within the European Council. It is also difficult to see how 
it would be possible for this person to permanently combine his/her national and European 
responsibilities.  
Instead, it is proposed that the European Council would elect a permanent President from among its 
former members. The implications of this option depend very much on the responsibilities that would 
be ascribed to this President. The various suggestions have remained rather vague on this matter. In 
some proposals (e.g. Badinter, 2002), the President remains a largely symbolic figure. Such an 
approach would only attenuate the current confusion and weaknesses of EU leadership. In examining 
this model, we thus concentrate on those variants that ascribe substantial powers to a permanent 
President of the EU Council. Besides chairing the European Council, the President can be expected to 
play a key role in the development of the Union’s foreign and defence policies and to represent the 
Union at the highest international level (Blair, 2000; Straw, 2002).  
The position of the HR may be retained in this perspective, but the administrative character of this 
function may be re-affirmed as the President will acquire a strong political profile. In line with this 
model, it has further been suggested that the other Council formations should choose long-term chairs 
from their midst, subject to an appropriate distribution of the chairs among the member states (Straw, 
2002). Together, these chairs would form some kind of Council Praesidium (Grant, 2002), presided by 
the EU President and supported by a beefed-up Council Secretariat. This Praesidium would hold the 
agenda-setting (and initiative) powers, shared with the Commission in those policy affairs that have 
been fully communitarised.  
The Commission President would develop into a sort of ‘Prime Minister’. Having a President with a 
strong external presence and a Prime Minister presiding over the internal administration, the Union 
architecture would slightly resemble the French semi-presidential system (cf. Duverger, 1980). Rather 
unlike the French system, however, the two positions would simultaneously derive their mandate from 
the same institution. Moreover, unlike the French President, the Council President would not have the 
power to fire the Commission President (Hix, 2002c). As the appointment procedure of the 
Commission President would not be revised in this scenario, the European Council would basically 
control all leadership positions in the Union, even though in the case of the Commission President, the 
European Parliament would enjoy the power to veto its nominee. 
Efficacy of office 
A permanent President of the Union would solve a number of problems presently associated with the 
rotating Presidency. It would bring continuity and stability to the political initiatives taken in the 
European Council. The President would have sufficient time to prepare meetings and to ensure the 
follow-up of decisions taken. Above all, it would vest the power to represent the Union throughout the 
world in a permanent and political figure. At last, it is argued, the Union President would offer a 
formal answer to Henry Kissinger’s famous question what number to dial to get Europe on the line. 
Whether these advantages can actually be reaped in practice, however, remains another matter. Taken 
on its own, the impact of establishing a permanent European Council President should not be 
overestimated. Getting the CFSP off the ground hinges on more than institutional reform. Having an 
EU President does not necessarily create a single voice. In the end, what is crucial is the political will 
of the member states to cede their autonomous power in international relations and to have their 
interests represented by a European politician. The current HR, Javier Solana, has little confidence that 
this willingness exists: ‘No matter who the EU President is, the prime ministers and presidents of 
member states will still want to go to Washington to see President Bush’ (Financial Times, 16 October 
2002). What is more, some external powers will still be located in the Commission, such as trade and 
development, and hence the duality of office-holders and administrations will remain. 
While it is thus far from certain that the President will be actually able to command much external 
power, it is sure that he will not have much internal powers either, as these will remain mostly in the 
hands of the Commission President. In the end, a permanent Union President may at best have much  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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time to spare, while at worst he/she may interfere with the exercise of powers attributed to other 
European actors. 
Institutional balance 
The main risk of a permanent President of the European Council derives from the fact that it focuses 
only on the intergovernmental side of the Union’s framework, while doing little on the supranational 
side of the balance. As a consequence, it raises questions about the hierarchical relationship between 
the Union President and the Commission President, as well as about the relationship between the 
Praesidium and the Commission.  
Potentially, the President and the Praesidium could come to claim a central directing role in Union 
politics. Fears have been raised that the Praesidium may even turn into some sort of directoire of the 
big member states. Indeed, given the number of Council formations, some countries will not be 
represented in the Praesidium. These fears are probably somewhat exaggerated, however, because by 
banding together the great number of small member states should be able to secure a strong presence 
in the Praesidium (Grant, 2002). Still, it is hard to see how the Praesidium could embody the interests 
of all the member states in an appropriately balanced way. 
In the absence of an absolute delineation of roles, coordination problems are likely to arise between 
the Council and the Commission, if not outright competition and conflict between the two executive 
bodies and their Presidents. In fact, this proposal elevates the tension between the HR and the RELEX 
Commissioner to the highest level (cf. de Schoutheete and Wallace, 2002). Eventually the rivalry 
between the Council and the Commission may come to be institutionalised in a ‘parallel Europe’, with 
two similar-looking executive bodies each headed by a President, with two separate work 
programmes.  
The vesting of executive powers in the Council would also challenge the position of the European 
Parliament. It would not have any means to hold the Council President accountable. At the same time, 
the powers of executive control that the European Parliament enjoys vis-à-vis the Commission would 
be threatened in those fields where the Union President and the Praesidium encroach upon the 
Commission’s role. One could envisage granting the European Parliament the right to start an 
impeachment procedure against the Union President (Badinter, 2002), but this mechanism obviously 
could not be relied upon to provide for normal accountability. 
Democracy 
As the EU President would be appointed by the European Council, this option not only duplicates the 
democratic problems that are currently attached to the appointment of the Commission President, but 
extends them moreover to the Council President (cf. section 3.1 above). Even if the European 
Parliament would subject the European Council’s nominee to a vote of approval (Badinter, 2002; 
Pöttering, 2002), this vote would probably be dominated by the preferences of the member 
governments rather than by electoral preferences. 
What is more, as the two appointments are put in the hands of one and the same intergovernmental 
body, they are likely to become subject to horse-trading practices. Which candidates would be chosen 
might come to depend more on the question of ‘whose turn’ it is than on the merits of the available 
candidates. Member states would also be tempted to trade their support for one of the candidacies if 
others would be willing to support their preferred candidate for the other post. When it comes to the 
designation of the Council chairs, similar practices are likely to emerge. 
Finally, even if the two Presidents succeed in organising a division of political tasks, the system is 
bound to remain confusing. It will be hard to explain to the European public why the Union needs two 
Presidents heading two different executive bodies, appointed in the same manner for the same period, 
with overlapping competencies. 
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This option may have advantages in terms of efficacy but in the end they are likely to be outweighed by its 
downsides. It threatens the institutional balance by strengthening merely the intergovernmental side. Finally, it 
does not give citizens electoral choice and is likely to perpetuate – and possibly even to widen – the sense of 
disconnectedness felt by the general public from the Union. 
3.3  Semi-parliamentary model 
The semi-parliamentary model recognises that leadership in the Union needs to be reinforced but also 
that doing so exclusively from the confines of the Council threatens to undermine the institutional 
balance within the Union. This model proposes to retain the rotating Presidency and to re-centre it on 
its procedural responsibilities, while transferring much of the executive tasks of the Presidency to the 
Commission. Rather than focusing on a permanent EU President, it seeks to clarify the current 
division of tasks in the Union (cf. Commission, 2002). Crucial to this is the distinction between 
legislative and executive decision-making.  
This model falls short of full parliamentarianism as it keeps the member states strongly involved in 
legislative and executive affairs through the Council and the European Council. The European Council 
remains the supreme political body, thus allowing the member states to provide the strategic 
guidelines and to determine the long-term agenda of the Union. The Council would exercise the 
legislative power together with the European Parliament, but would still hold substantial executive 
powers as well. The rotating Presidency would be retained for the European Council as well as for the 
Council in its legislative setting.  
The Commission would however relieve the Presidency from some of its executive responsibilities in 
some truly ‘governmental’ areas (e.g. CFSP, JHA, and EMU). Council meetings concerning executive 
issues would be prepared and chaired by a Member of the Commission (EPC, 2002). This arrangement 
has the advantage that there would no longer be a presiding member state that can impose its wishes or 
is forced to renounce its national point of view. Having a Commissioner in the chair may, moreover, 
contribute to better coordination and continuity. Given the Commission’s central role in proposing 
legislative measures, this solution would not be adopted for legislative Council meetings. In turn the 
Commission could continue to play its conciliatory role in the co-decision procedure between the 
Council and the European Parliament. 
The sharing of executive powers between the Council and the Commission would also be manifest in 
other aspects. The external representation tasks of the Presidency would be transferred to the HR, who 
would be appointed by the Council. The HR would be double-hatted: he would combine the functions 
of the former HR with those of the Relex Commissioner (Convention 2002/459). He or she would take 
part of the workings of the Commission, but for certain issues would be directly responsible to the 
Council. The Commission’s right of initiative would be extended to the 2
nd and 3
rd pillar, although 
member states may retain a right of initiative for certain executive matters (CFSP). 
The strengthening of the Commission would have to be met by an increase in its accountability. The 
appointment of the Commission could be democratised along one of the lines discussed in the 
previous section. Most likely, the Commission President would be elected by the European 
Parliament, and approved by the European Council. The HR and the rest of the College would be 
selected by the President in collaboration with the member states and would be subject to a vote of 
approval by the European Parliament. 
Efficacy of office 
This option promises to improve the effectiveness of the Union in two key respects. First, it provides 
the Union with a more recognisable representation in the world. The incorporation of the High 
Representative in the Commission ensures that whoever speaks for Europe will also command the 
required means to deliver. The President of the European Council would be released of external 
representation tasks.  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Secondly, it would do much to coordinate the exercise of executive powers within the Union. Thus, it 
may attenuate the potential divergences and rivalries that currently exist between the Commission and 
the Council, and their respective administrations, in the exercise of executive tasks. 
Despite these advantages, however, the prospects for this model depend eventually on the willingness 
of the member governments to actually turn over the powers they currently enjoy in external affairs 
and in holding the Presidency. Member states generally have been reluctant to delegate executive 
powers, and whenever they have done so they have tried to claw them back by legislating in great 
detail and by introducing control mechanisms (‘comitology’). The distinction between legislative and 
executive tasks may hence be easier to make in theory than in practice.  
With particular regard to external relations, the merger of the HR and the Relex Commissioner is 
strongly opposed by certain member states that are unwilling to involve the Commission in CFSP. 
Notably and not surprisingly, the persons currently holding the two posts are not really convinced of 
the case for a merger.
13 
Democracy  
This model does push the European Union more in the direction of a parliamentary system. It lends 
more weight to electoral choice as it strengthens the relation between the European Parliament and the 
Commission President. The extension of the Commission President’s authority over the whole remit of 
the Union’s competencies would further enhance the public appeal of his/her election. 
The elections of the European Parliament would probably become the key political event for the 
Union, since by determining the composition of the European Parliament the electorate would also 
decide who can become Commission President. Thus, this model holds out all the democratic 
promises  and  dangers that we attached before to the option of having the Commission President 
chosen by the European Parliament (see section 2.2). Most importantly if a close-knit political 
coalition would be able to gather a secure majority in the European Parliament, it could be able to 
dominate both the Parliament as well as the Commission (Hix, 2002b: 24; cf. section 2.2 above).  
By retaining the rotating Presidency, this office will continue to attract some public attention and 
create a sense of ownership. The splitting-up of Council formations would also allow for openness 
when the Council legislates. Surely, however, this option is not the most comprehensible, as the Union 
would still have two Presidents and a difficult chairman system.  
Institutional balance 
Since the European Parliament would come to control the selection of the Union’s executive, there is a 
danger of the Union developing into an outright parliamentary system. However, the European 
Council would be able to veto the EP’s candidate and would be strongly involved in the other 
appointments. Also it would still set the long-term agenda. Moreover, the Council would retain a 
strong presence in legislative as well as executive procedures. 
The rotating Presidency would be kept in the legislative councils and in the European Council. In that 
way, the equality of member states is ensured in these bodies. As many executive responsibilities 
would be taken over by the Commissioners, the Council Presidency is unlikely to develop into a 
genuine political body. At the same time, this division of tasks allows the Commission to play its 
‘honest broker’ role within the Council for executive matters, as well as between the Council and the 
European Parliament for legislative matters.  
Nonetheless, it may still be necessary to provide additional guarantees ensuring that the Commission 
remains accountable to the member governments in the Council and the European Council. One could 
envisage the European Council acquiring the right to censure the Commission (Commission, 2002) 
and to dissolve the European Parliament when it censures the Commission. Without such controls, an 
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entrepreneurial Commission may well be called back by member states reasserting their political 
primacy.  
This option potentially increases the Union’s efficacy by fostering a greater synergy between the Council and the 
Commission. It has some notable advantages in terms of democracy. Europe’s citizens are given electoral choice 
and the emergence of a European political space will be stimulated. However, to preserve the institutional 
balance, substantial precautions are needed to preclude the Union from developing into an outright parliamentary 
system and to ensure that the strengthened Commission will retain the confidence of the member states. 
3.4  Unified presidential model 
As the former two options retain the distinction between the Council Presidency and the Commission 
President but reinforce one side over the other, they risk undermining the institutional balance in the 
EU. The remaining two options explore the possibility of using the reorganisation of Union leadership 
to bridge the gap between intergovernmental and supranational conceptions. They involve the creation 
of a permanent EU president joining ‘two hats’, the Presidency of the European Council and of the 
Commission (Duff, 2002; Dini and Lequiller, 2003).  
With one unified president, executive leadership in the EU would no longer be divided. The new EU 
President would actually come to preside over all leadership tasks currently shared between the 
Presidency and the Commission President. These models also suggest that the administrative 
organisations of Commission and Council secretariat might be integrated in one common structure so 
as to improve coordination between them. The specialised Council formations (except perhaps the 
External Affairs Council) might choose a more or less permanent chair from among their members. 
The implications of a unification of the presidencies depend to a great extent upon the accompanying 
reforms. In this section, we first explore the variant in which the member states retain a firm control 
over the EU President. Following the proposals for a non-unified European Council President, the EU 
President would be a former Head of State or Government selected by the European Council. This 
European Council President would also come to preside over the Commission.  
Besides the executive powers currently enjoyed by the Commission President, the new EU President 
would share certain executive powers in the fields that are currently controlled by the member states, 
most notably the CFSP. The EU President would have the right to propose initiatives in all policy 
fields, but this right might also be shared with (groups of) member states. The President would further 
propose the Union’s long-term agenda, which would then need to be approved by the European 
Council. In his external representation role, the President would be seconded by the HR, who would 
also be appointed by the European Council and chair the External Affairs Council. 
Efficacy of Office 
The big advantage of this model is that it avoids a power struggle at the top of the Union, as well as at 
the level of the administrations, and ensures better policy coordination. The President would follow a 
clear multi-annual agenda for the Union, avoiding the current stop-and-go cycles. As the European 
Council would have a permanent President, there could also be better preparation and follow-up of its 
meetings. Moreover, the unified Presidency would guarantee optimal coordination between the long-
term strategies devised in the European Council and the mid- and short-term policies developed in the 
Commission. 
Furthermore, this model provides Europe with a strong and recognisable face in the world. Indeed, as 
the model merges two functions with important external powers (the Presidency and the Commission 
President), the EU President could emerge as a major figure in global politics. Though her or his 
powers would probably be more limited than that of his US or Russian counterpart, s/he should have 
no problems in sharing the platform with them. In maintaining the external relations of the Union, the 
President would be seconded by the HR for CFSP and by members of the Commission for other 
external affairs. Thus, at the level below the President, external responsibilities would remain 
somewhat divided.  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Institutional balance 
In many respects, the unified EU Presidency would overcome the intergovernmental-supranational 
antagonism that now so often characterises the Union’s institutional politics. The Presidency itself 
would embody the need to preserve a balance between the European Council and the Commission. 
Compared to the earlier option of a ‘pseudo semi-presidential system’, smaller member states are 
therefore likely to prefer this option, as the institutionalised link between the Commission and the 
Council might help to avoid the emergence of a directoire of big member states. 
The European Council would enjoy a privileged connection with the EU President. Besides being 
selected by the European Council, the EU President would also be a former member. The President 
would have to develop a good working relationship with the Council as he or she will draft the multi-
annual agenda in close contact with the member states and obtain their approval. Moreover, he/she 
would depend on the European Council for re-election.  
Nevertheless, this model poses a serious risk to the Union’s institutional balance if it fails to subject 
the President’s powers to appropriate constraints. He/she would be the only member of the European 
Council dealing permanently with European affairs, would reside permanently in Brussels and would 
be able to rely on the expertise in the Commission. The President would become the ultimate policy-
initiator. He/she would chair the body that determines the long-term agenda (the European Council), 
as well as the body that sets the medium-term agenda (the Commission).  
In the European Council, this would raise a particular problem in those situations where it has come to 
act as a sort of ‘court of appeal’ for settling decisions that proved too complex or too contentious to 
resolve at Council level (de Schoutheete and Wallace, 2002). In those cases the President would chair 
the body that proposes and the body that ultimately disposes.
14 
A particularly dangerous situation would occur if the EU President would be able to work in close 
tandem with a secure majority of member governments. Then the question would arise what checks 
and balances remain to keep her or his powers in control and to protect the interests of those in the 
political minority. The Commission would be an unlikely source of countervailing power as the hand 
of the President’s powers in the designation of Commissioners and their portfolios will probably be 
strengthened even further. The President would act as the main messenger of the desires of the 
European Council and bear an increased responsibility for monitoring the extent to which the 
European Council’s desires are properly followed up. Thus, the Commission would lose much of its 
independence vis-à-vis the European Council. In the legislative process, the Commission’s role as 
‘honest broker’ between both branches of the legislature would be undermined. 
This would leave the European Parliament as the final checking power. However, the European 
Parliament might well turn out to be the big institutional loser of a unified Presidency controlled by 
the European Council. As the EU President would rely on the support of the European Council, the 
powers by which the European Parliament can hold the Commission accountable would be reduced. 
Thus, the European Parliament would retain few powers through which it might effectively obstruct 
the President’s initiatives. 
Democracy 
In this model, the selection of the EU President remains dominated by the European Council. Thus, 
electoral preferences hardly bear upon this selection and the nomination process will probably remain 
rather opaque. At the same time, it is hardly conceivable that the appointment of a person with such 
extended powers would not be subject to some form of popular election. In due time, it would appear, 
this model would require the European Council’s nominee for the Presidency to be approved by the 
European Parliament. 
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The unified Presidency would much improve the accessibility of the European Union with one 
President chairing the main executive bodies. The presence and familiarity of this position may 
increase the public appeal of the office as well as of the European Union as a whole. As a result, 
European politics may receive more public attention and public pressure on Union policies might 
increase. Whatever the public effects, however, they are unlikely to be much felt as this model leaves 
few mechanisms for democratic accountability.  
If any future re-organisation of EU leadership is to strengthen the Union’s executive capacities, it may well be 
this one, but it would do so at severe costs in terms of the institutional balance and democracy. Once s/he 
enjoyed secure support in the European Council, the EU President’s powers would be subject to few checks and 
balances. The role of the European Parliament might well be reduced to that of a critical bystander unable to 
make an effective fist and the Commission might lose much of its independence. While an EU President may 
enhance the Union’s public appeal, it leaves few mechanisms through which democratic accountability can be 
secured. 
3.5  Democratised presidential model 
If the objections to the former model are taken seriously, we are led to consider the final option in 
which the unified model is democratised along the lines discussed in section 2. Since the EU President 
would not be fully under the control of the European Council, the President as well as the Commission 
would be more likely to enjoy a more independent role. At the same time it is crucial in this model that 
the powers of the President and the Commission are subject to effective control mechanisms by the 
two bodies of the legislature.  
As in the previous model, the Council Secretariat would be merged into the Commission services. The 
Commission would have the sole right of initiative and would set the multi-annual programme. To 
assist the President in external affairs, he or she would appoint a Foreign Secretary whose remit would 
include all aspects of external affairs, those currently delegated to the Commission as well as those 
currently falling under the HR. Naturally, the (European) Council would continue to have a strong 
voice in some truly governmental matters.  
Democracy 
The discussion in section 2 might lead us to suggest that the way to democratise the unified Presidency 
is to have her or him elected by the European Parliament. With the reinforced powers the President is 
to enjoy in this model, however, this might well tilt the institutional balance too much to the side of 
the European Parliament. What is more, it will be much harder to prevent such a system from 
developing into a majoritarian system in which the opposition is in all respects outflanked by the 
governing coalition. 
Therefore, to secure divided government in the Union, it is preferable to grant the President a distinct 
base of democratic legitimacy (Hix, 2002b). The ideal option might be a carefully calibrated direct 
election (cf. section 2.6). As outlined above, this option can be expected to have the most direct and 
profound democratic effects. It is bound to have as broad a public appeal as any election can garner. 
Election campaigns for the Presidency would engage a European public opinion around unequivocally 
European issues and stimulate the evolution of a European political system. 
However, direct election of a Union President is a most radical step, the implications and risks of 
which are hard to foresee. At this point, this step may be too big and come too soon for the European 
electorate. What is more, the checks and balances needed to accommodate such a directly chosen 
President within the institutional balance may need time to develop. For these reasons, election by a 
Congress of Parliamentarians may be the more prudent alternative in the short term.  
Indeed, as a unified Presidency would increase the stakes, some of the objections raised against 
election by a Congress would be softened. Even though this selection procedure does not directly 
involve the European electorate, its public appeal is likely to be considerable. Election by a Congress 
would provide an important stimulus to the development of a genuinely European party structure and 
the emergence of a European political sphere. What is more, the very presence and visibility of an EU  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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Presidency and the sequencing of the selection procedure with the EP elections would do much to 
enhance the appeal of European elections. 
Efficacy of Office 
This model shares many of the advantages of the former one. It would allow for the development of a 
strong and coherent European executive. External action would be better coordinated than under the 
previous model, as this model would fuse all external activities under the heading of the Commission. 
It would be the prime responsibility of the Foreign Secretary who would serve under the President’s 
authority. Hence, those who would speak for Europe would command all the necessary powers.  
One danger of this model, however, is that it may engage the Commission too much in adversary 
politics against the two legislative bodies. As illustrated by the example of the US Clinton Presidency, 
too strong a Presidency may well backfire if it fails to command sufficient support in the legislature. 
Institutional balance 
A democratised EU Presidency would provide the Union with a genuine supranational face, which at 
the same time enjoys a close institutional link with the member states through the European Council. 
By giving the chair of the European Council to the Commission President and placing the monopoly 
of initiative in the Commission, this model enhances the powers of the Commission in certain areas 
where its powers have been restricted until now, such as the second and third pillar and 
macroeconomic policy. At the same time, it develops the role of the President beyond that of primes 
inter pares and turns him into the linchpin of democratic accountability. This may somewhat 
complicate the relations of the President with the rest of the college, especially as some more 
hierarchical elements will impinge on their collegial relations. Still, given the fact that the President 
would be less dependent on the Council, (s)he may be able to develop a closer working relationship 
with the Commissioners than under the previous option. 
The key for this model to work will be the evolution of a smooth-functioning system of checks and 
balances. As in the present situation, the Council and European Parliament would remain the 
gatekeepers of the Union by virtue of their control over the legislative process. Both the Council and 
the European Parliament might enjoy the right to censure the Commission and its President, requiring 
a new election. As long as the President is to be elected by the Congress, it would also be up to the 
Congress to exercise the power of censure after it had received a proposal to that effect from the 
European Parliament or the Council. 
As a counterforce to the integration of executive powers, the development of a mature system of 
executive oversight would appear desirable. Thus one may envisage a formalisation of the current 
comitology procedure akin to the role played by the committees of the US Congress. At the same time, 
one might also expect the European Parliament to seek to engage itself more actively in these 
processes, either through its own committees or by seeking access to the member states’ committees. 
This final model calls for a radical democratisation at the heart of European executive power: the election of a 
unified EU President, initially by a Congress and possibly over time developing into a direct election model. At 
the same time, unifying the Presidency should bring great benefits in terms of efficacy. As the powers of the 
President would be substantial, the European Parliament and the Council should be equipped with effective 
checks and balances involving full legislative powers as well as the right to censure and a mature system of 
executive oversight.  
3.6  Preliminary conclusions on an EU President 
In this section, we have shown how the current organisation of leadership in the Union still pretty 
much embodies the tenacious institutional balance that has traditionally characterised the EU. In a 
way, one might concede that the EU has so far benefited from suppressing the question of genuine 
leadership through the Presidency and leaving it to be diluted by the rotation system. Even without 
explicitly aiming to do so, the institutional balance has been remarkably well retained. Nevertheless, 
the current system does not supply the leadership the Union needs. What is more, the advantages in  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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terms of institutional balance and democracy are bound to become more diluted in future. Therefore, 
the organisation of EU leadership in its present form cannot be sustained.  
We have outlined four alternative models of the organisation of the EU Presidency. These models are 
designed above all to tackle the current problems in terms of efficacy. Strong and visible leadership 
can do much to benefit the future Union. Still, the efficacy of leadership not only depends on what sort 
of President the Union has, but also (and more importantly) on what happens in terms of 
accompanying reforms. With this in mind, we have linked the question of leadership with other issues, 
such as the possible fusion of the administrative apparati and the power to set the policy agenda. 
Beyond that, the question of leadership points towards the importance of a clear delineation of the 
Union’s external responsibilities and towards the need to reconsider the voting procedures in use 
(qmv). The outcome of these challenges will to a great extent determine the capacity of the President 
to provide actual leadership. Thus the reform of the Presidency appears as just the ‘tip of the iceberg’.  
Table 3 summarises the various models and the accompanying measures we have ascribed to them. Of 
course, the choice of each of these measures is debatable and an infinite number of other combinations 
is conceivable. However, each of these models appears to have a certain internal logic in terms of the 
likely accompanying measures.  
Table 3. Five models for the EU Presidency and accompanying measures 
 Present  situation  Pseudo  semi-
presidentialism 
Semi-
parliamentary 
Unified 
Presidency 
Democratised 
unified model 
Selection of 
President 
Six-monthly 
Rotation 
European Council  EP+ 
European Council 
European Council  Direct election 
(Congress) 
Administrative 
structure 
Dual Dual:  Council-
Secr. dominant 
Dual: Commis-
sion dominant 
Unified  Unified 
External 
representation 
Council + HR + 
Commission 
Council President 
+ HR 
Double hat  President + HR  President+ 
Foreign Secretary 
Right of initiative  Commission + 
MS in 2/3 pillar 
Council 
(+Commission) 
Commission in 
all domains 
President + 
MS in some cases 
President 
Agenda-setting 
powers 
Presidency + 
Commission 
Praesidium + 
Commission 
Presidency + 
Commission 
Council + 
President 
President 
 
All four new models improve the efficacy of leadership, at least to some extent. Major improvements 
can especially be made in both unified models. However, all models also pose a serious challenge to 
the institutional balance of the EU. A permanent President under the control of the European Council 
is likely to undermine the role of the Commission as guardian of the European interest and will reduce 
the EP’s powers. This holds for the pseudo semi-presidential model and, especially, the non-
democratised unified model. Moreover, neither of these models does much to improve the democratic 
character of the Union. 
Conversely, the semi-parliamentary and the democratised unified model have their advantages in 
terms of democracy, but they (and especially the latter) are likely to cause a breach of confidence 
between the member states and the supranational institutions. 
Table 4. Schematic overview of the implications of five options for the EU President 
 Present 
situation 
Pseudo semi-
presidentialism 
Semi-
parliamentary 
Unified 
Presidency 
Democratised 
Unified 
Efficacy  - ± ± + + 
Democracy  ± - + - + 
Institutional balance  +  ±  ±  -  ± 
 
What then is the way forward? Can we move towards more effective EU leadership while also 
respecting the institutional balance and, if possible, improving the Union’s democratic credentials? 
Basically, the first two models (the pseudo semi-presidential and the semi-parliamentary model) 
remain too modest: while they push executive powers to one side of the institutional balance, they  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
 32 
remain caught in the current opposition between more intergovernmental and more supranational 
elements in the Union. If the Convention (and the IGC) were to adopt one of these models, they are 
unlikely to be durable solutions as they do little more than ‘tinker at the margin’ while retaining, and 
probably even exacerbating the deeper problems involving the institutional balance of the Union. 
Notably, the recent Franco-German compromise on a permanent European Council President and an 
EP-elected Commission President (Chirac and Schröder, 2003) serves to exemplify these objections. 
This proposal reaps (some of) the efficiency gains attributed to a permanent European Council 
President, complementing it with a genuine democratic improvement on the side of the Commission 
President. However, instead of overcoming the opposition between the intergovernmental and the 
community side of the Union, it entrenches this opposition in the organisation of leadership. The 
ensuing system will be even more vulnerable to institutionalised conflict and deadlock than the present 
French semi-presidential system. The reformed European Council President will be deeply integrated 
within the structures of the European Council, while the Commission President is liable to be captured 
by the majority of the European Parliament. The competition between the two Presidents is likely to 
do permanent damage to the Union's institutional balance.  
Executive leadership in the Union requires a solution that bridges the gap between intergovernmental 
and supranational conceptions and reconciles the current opposition (or even crisis of confidence) 
between the Commission and the Council. More concretely, it has to prevent the emergence of a 
“parallel Europe” around the Commission and the Council, with two competing administrative 
structures, both with their own President competing for Union leadership. Such a solution may be 
found by unifying the Presidencies of the European Council and the Commission.  
However, we have shown that a unified Presidency can lead into very different directions, depending 
on the accompanying reforms. Indeed we have shown that in a non-democratised form, the unified 
model may well be the surest way to upset the institutional balance, since – by controlling the Union’s 
President and, by implication, the Commission – the Council would in fact take full executive control 
of the Union. At the same time, the European Parliament and other democratic mechanisms would be 
marginalised. 
This leaves us with the democratised unified model that merges the posts of President of the European 
Council and the Commission President and has this person directly elected (or by a Congress during a 
transitory period). Clearly, coming from the present situation, this model requires some 
groundbreaking reforms. Moreover, as it involves step changes both in the Union’s executive 
organisation as well as in its democratic character, one may fear it could turn into the much-dreaded 
superstate beyond the member states’ control.  
These risks may, be warded off, however, by appropriate accompanying reforms. As we emphasised 
before, the President should be bound to maintain a privileged relationship with the member states, 
especially through the European Council. In particular, one can imagine granting the member states 
the exclusive right to nominate candidates for President, and possibly allowing the European Council 
acting by qmv to annul ‘inappropriate nominations’. Also the Council and the European Parliament 
might get the power to veto (individually) the nominees of the President for the College of 
Commissioners. 
Other accompanying measures can be added to ensure that the member states are still fully involved 
with the Union and are able to co-direct the course of events: 
−  Member states in the Council should still have a primary say on all purely ‘governmental matters’ 
(CFSP, EMU, police and judicial cooperation) (EPC, 2002), although the involvement of the 
reformed Commission should be beefed up. 
−  The President could be assisted by a double-hatted Foreign Secretary appointed by and directly 
accountable to the member states. 
−  The member states should still have a right of initiative for some matters (CFSP), possibly with a 
right of assent for the Commission and the Foreign Secretary.  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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−  The multi-annual agenda could be based on an inter-institutional agreement between the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the European Council. 
Thus, the fine-tuning of the democratised unified model could respond to the triple challenge of 
rendering the Union more effective and democratic, whilst respecting the Union’s institutional 
balance.  
4.  Conclusion: Prospects for democratic and accountable EU leadership 
The question of EU leadership is inextricably bound up with that of the organisation of European 
executive power. It was not foreseen that Europe would develop a genuine executive power of its own. 
As a consequence, over time, executive responsibilities have been scattered across the institutions. 
Currently the Commission President, the Presidency and the High Representative for CFSP are the 
main institutions of executive leadership in the Union. 
Some might be tempted to regard the dispersion of executive power and leadership as a virtue in its 
own right. Indeed the idea that political powers are best left disorganised in the Union lies behind 
many of the fashionable analyses that celebrate the EU as ‘a system of governance’, rather than ‘a 
system of government’. The current constitutional debate reveals, however, a need to impose a 
governmental structure upon the unique system of governance currently harboured by the Union (cf. 
Quermonne, 2002).  
All three evaluative perspectives adopted in this study reveal the need for an organisation of the Union 
that goes beyond the loose concept of governance. First of all, considerations of efficacy require a 
better organisation of executive power in the Union. Also from a democratic perspective, the current 
situation fails even at the most basic level to provide citizens transparency and openness of the 
procedures by which they are governed, not to mention effective electoral choice and a genuine public 
sphere. In this situation, the much-cherished institutional balance has also come to the point of nearly 
being exhausted. Throughout the incremental transformations that the Union has undergone, this 
balance has been retained. At this point, however, the various institutions risk becoming gridlocked, 
rather than balancing each other, if not by their internal procedures (unanimity in the Council), then by 
their interplay. 
Hence, leadership in the EU is in dire need of rethinking and reorganisation. Our examination of the 
options has been guided by three major imperatives. First, EU leadership should be effective. The 
future Union will require a visible and strong leader(s). At the same time, reforming EU leadership 
cannot be considered without also taking account of the widely felt need to make the Union more 
democratic. Ultimately this requires giving Europe’s voters electoral choice with regard to the 
leadership of the Union. Finally, in reforming EU leadership, one also needs to take into account the 
peculiar nature of the EU as a Union of states and peoples. The current institutional balance between 
the Union’s triangle should be maintained. 
In section 2, we considered the long-standing debate on the democratisation of the Commission 
President. We concluded that the new provisions in the Treaty of Nice will politicise the appointment 
process in the European Council and will open important prospects for the EP party-groups to grasp 
the initiative in the selection procedure. Taking the reforms to their logical conclusion would, 
however, require the strengthening of electoral choice by having the Commission President elected by 
the European Parliament after the European elections and confirmed by the European Council. In due 
course, one might consider moving to direct election of the Commission President. 
By now, however, the debate on the democratisation of the Commission President has become caught 
up with the more recent debate on the future of the EU Presidency. Following the logic of 
communitarisation, one might be tempted to move towards a semi-parliamentary model in which the 
Presidency’s responsibilities are refocused on procedural matters, and most executive responsibilities 
of the Presidency are transferred to the Commission. On the other hand, we witness a strong 
movement advocating the establishment of a permanent President of the European Council. Both of 
these models remain caught in the contest between those advocating more intergovernmental elements  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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in the Union and those championing a more supranational model. Since both retain the distinction 
between the Council Presidency and the Commission President but strengthen one side over the other, 
they risk undermining the institutional balance in the EU.  
Any successful reorganisation of executive leadership in the Union needs to overcome the gap 
between intergovernmental and supranational conceptions. More concretely, it has to prevent the 
emergence of a “parallel Europe” around the Commission and the Council, with two competing 
administrative structures, both with their own President competing for Union leadership. Notably, the 
recent Franco-German proposal of a reformed dual presidency (Chirac and Schröder, 2003) seems to 
set the course for exactly such a parallel Europe and therefore looks like the perfect recipe for conflict 
and even deadlock.  
In order to avoid squandering the Union’s resources and its comprehensibility by the emergence of 
two parallel and competing administrations, the option of merging the European Council Presidency 
with that of the Commission into one unified Presidency needs to be considered. Such a radical reform 
is only feasible if accompanied by measures that serve to respect the institutional balance and 
democratise the Union. 
Eventually, our framework leads us to a fine-tuned democratised unified model, which carefully 
balances supranational elements with countervailing reforms so as to ensure that the interests and 
liberties of the member states are duly respected. It unites all European executive capacity under one 
President, overcoming the present administrative duality and clarifying the Union’s organisation. It 
recognises that to have the President appointed by either Council or Parliament will put the Union's 
balance at risk if he can command a stable legislative majority and alienate the remaining minority 
from executive power. Thus we suggest direct election of the President by the citizenry or, during a 
transitory period, by a Congress composed of national and European parliamentarians. Such election 
procedures should be calibrated by assigning appropriate weights to the national shares and by 
granting the Council and the European Parliament some powers over the nomination process. 
At the same time, if this model is to be feasible, it is crucial that the President’s powers are subject to 
effective political constraints. Both the European Council and the European Parliament should be able 
to hold the President and the Commission accountable. The Council should remain the final decision 
centre for certain executive matters (CFSP, EMU, police and judicial cooperation), although the 
Commission should be more involved in the administration of these matters. In terms of external 
presence, having the President assisted by a double-hatted ‘Foreign Secretary of the Union’ looks like 
a reasonable compromise. 
The Convention on the Future of the EU has a unique opportunity right now to rebuild the Union’s 
structure. If it wants an effective exercise of executive powers at Union level, it will need to organise 
strong, visible and unified leadership. By adopting the option of a democratised unified President, the 
Convention can provide a long-term solution to the current leadership problem of the European Union, 
which – if appropriately fine-tuned – can meet the triple challenge of rendering the Union more 
effective and democratic, whilst respecting the Union’s institutional balance.  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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ANNEX 
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK IN FULL 
In this annex each of the three dimensions – efficacy, democracy and institutional balance – is 
elaborated and dissected in a number of more specific aspects. Together these aspects provide us with 
the normative framework with which the various proposals to reorganise leadership in the Union are 
evaluated. 
Efficacy of office 
Arguing for the reorganisation of leadership in the Union requires first and foremost that one expects it 
to contribute to a better functioning of the Union overall. The easiest way to demonstrate the issues at 
stake here is to draw upon the current situation (cf. section 1.1). The most striking characteristic of 
current leadership in the Union is that it is divided. Division of the leadership task is not a bad thing in 
itself and within the Union there may be pertinent reasons justifying it. Still, within the complex Union 
architecture, effective leadership requires well functioning coordinating powers. To be effective, 
leadership in the Union needs to contribute to the coordination of the political process by commanding 
powers that reach across the institutional divides that currently exist. 
Effective leadership is not merely an issue of accumulating powers, however. Any formal exercise of 
power may well run hollow if it lacks authority due to ineffective lines of communication and 
accountability. The organisation of leadership needs to ensure that it is in a position to command 
support from the various Union institutions. Thus, a second aspect of the efficacy of leadership in the 
Union is a modicum of (internal) accountability, i.e. some degree of embeddedness within the Union 
architecture. 
The support that Union leadership can gather from inside the Union will also need to be 
complemented by the recognition it receives from outside the Union. Indeed, the lack of external 
presence is often referred to as the major indicator of a lack of leadership in the Union. A major test 
for leadership of the Union is thus whether international actors – most concretely, the US President – 
will recognise that it provides them with an equal and credible partner.  
Finally, whatever the formal powers and provisions made to organise leadership, its effectiveness will 
to a large extent depend on the people who are selected to take up the task(s). Hence, the future 
organisation of leadership within the Union will have to be shaped in such a way as to ensure that 
indeed the position(s) involved attract the best-qualified people. In the end a major aspect in shaping 
the efficacy of Union leadership will be the extent to which it fosters selection by merit.  
Effective Union leadership is thus more than just a matter of powers. It also depends on its 
embeddedness in the Union architecture, its external presence and the merits of the people it attracts. 
All four aspects need to be taken into account when evaluating possible ways to organise Union 
leadership in the future.  
Democracy  
The democratic character of the European Union is seriously questioned on many fronts. There is a 
wide range of diagnoses of the presumed ‘democratic deficit’ as well as a wide range of possible 
solutions (cf. Weiler et al., 1995; Lodge, 1997; Dehousse, 1995; Moravcsik, 2002). The reorganisation 
of Union leadership need not be a necessary ingredient of any solution. Still, quite a number of 
proposals to reform Union leadership suggest that it may contribute to democratising the Union, or at 
least to increasing the engagement of citizens with the Union. To analyse the democratic potential of 
reforms of Union leadership properly, we do not look simply at electoral mechanisms but assess them 
in the context of a broader conception of democracy involving the appreciation of and the engagement 
with the Union by the citizens. 
A first way in which leadership reform may contribute to the democratic perception of the Union is by 
making it more transparent, or more specifically more comprehensible. A prime obstacle to popular 
engagement with the Union is the perceived complexity of its workings. Citizens are confronted with a  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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range of institutions whose powers are all conditional upon each other and whose interaction varies 
from one issue to another. A proper attribution of leadership within the Union might make a 
considerable contribution towards alleviating this problem. People in positions of leadership may 
serve as reference points for the public, instilling a sense of control, confidence and accountability. 
Thus, institutional clarity may foster participation (Magnette, 2001b). 
Besides being comprehensible, transparency also refers to the very way in which leadership 
responsibilities are assigned. Decision-making in the Union is generally regarded as opaque. In many 
cases, it is impossible to reconstruct how decisions are actually taken. This applies in particular to the 
intergovernmental settings of the Council and the European Council, where informal proceedings 
often prevail over formal decision-making rules (cf. Golub, 1999). Thus, democratising leadership in 
the Union also requires the very assignment of tasks and the selection of candidates to be characterised 
by openness. Openness requires not only that decision-making takes place in public; it also requires 
the public to be able to understand (and reconstruct) how the decisions have come to be reached. 
It is only after the first two democratic preconditions – establishing a comprehensible and open system 
– are met that we come to the actual engagement of citizens in the process. For sure, the democratic 
norm within any political system is that citizens should be able to exercise direct influence on the 
choice of the people in power. In modern democratic systems, electoral mechanisms provide for the 
most direct means by which all citizens can exercise their influence equally. Deviations from the 
democratic norm must be justified with good reasons, and even if they can be justified, the means may 
need to be sought to ensure that the electoral will is taken into account. The weak connection between 
Europe’s citizens and its institutions is a direct reflection of the weakness of the electoral mechanisms 
to which they are subject. Wherever power is exercised in the Union, citizens do not feel their 
preferences have much of an impact on it. Hence, there is a clear pressure to have any strengthening of 
leadership in the Union combined with effective mechanisms of electoral choice through which the 
public can effectively influence the selection of one candidate over another. 
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that Union democracy is merely a matter of offering 
electoral choice. Falling turn-outs in elections all over Europe demonstrate this fact and indeed the 
elections for the European Parliament may well provide one of the strongest cases. Elections only 
seriously contribute to democracy if they have sufficient public appeal. Indeed public appeal and 
engagement and the power they exert through the public space may in the end be more important 
democratic factors than the actual electoral procedure. Public appeal itself is again influenced by a 
wide range of factors. One of the most important of these factors is probably the powers ascribed to 
the office for which elections take place. A second factor is the extent to which the public perceives 
that it enjoys a meaningful choice or whether it rather feels that the system has largely prejudiced its 
choices. This second factor is of much relevance when it comes to Union leadership, as there are 
strong national and supranational interests in retaining control of the selection process. 
Public appeal may be triggered on an incidental basis and it may dissipate as swiftly as it has come 
about. In the context of the European Union, we have to take account of the more structural conditions 
beneficial for democracy. Many observers have pointed out that attempts to democratise the European 
Union suffer in the end from the structural absence of a European public sphere (Grimm, 1995). 
European politics is bound to stay out of touch with the citizens of Europe as long as there is no 
transnational public sphere to serve as a permanent mediator between them. To the extent that reform 
of the Union’s leadership is argued to have democratic merit, we thus also have to assess the extent to 
which the process fosters the emergence of a European political and public sphere. Concretely, 
European leadership may be organised in such a way as to foster the emergence of European parties 
and the necessary organisational and media infrastructure in which they can interact with each other. 
Offering the European citizens electoral choice may be instrumental in creating a European public 
sphere, as the resulting politicisation of and competition for Union leadership will raise the salience of 
the EU in national political debates (Risse, 2002). 
Thus we propose to take a broad perspective on the democratic dimension. We recognise the key role 
electoral choice may play. At the same time, however, we take aspects such as comprehensibility and 
openness to be of equal importance. Similarly, we submit that any full appreciation of the democratic  C OUSSENS & CRUM 
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impact of leadership reforms will need to take public appeal and the emergence of a European political 
and public sphere into account. 
Institutional balance 
This dimension concerns the specific institutional balance that needs to be observed in the Union (cf. 
Prechal, 1998; Lenarts and Verhoeven, 2002). The Union is no longer a normal international 
organisation but nor is it an autonomous, sovereign political system. It derives its powers (as well as 
the legitimacy to exercise them) from two sources: from the governments of each of the member states 
as represented in the Council, as well as from the citizens of these states as represented by the 
European Parliament. As a consequence of this, any re-organisation of Union leadership has to find a 
fine balance between those two sources of power. 
As it is not the EU’s vocation to become a centralised superstate replacing the member states, the 
Union will only be able to consolidate its own authority if it shows sufficient respect for the national 
states (Dehousse, 1995). One implication of this is that Union decision-making cannot be simply 
subject to majority rule. The Union cannot afford to permanently antagonise a majority versus a 
minority of member states (or functional interests). Consensual decision-making thus has to ensure 
that minority rights are protected against the majority rule. However, a mere consensus rule is 
problematic, since this permits a single state that benefits from the status-quo to block any kind of 
policy change that would further the general interest (Scharpf, 1988). 
Hence, in the EU, there needs to be a balance between majority rule and consensus-rule resembling the 
model of ‘divided government’ rather than that of fused powers (Hix, 2002b). This system of 
‘separated institutions sharing powers’ (Neustadt, 1990) enables the legislature to check the executive, 
given the independent selection of the executive and the legislature. Indeed as long as the EU remains 
characterised by a dual executive and a dual legislature, it is unlikely ever to resemble a full 
majoritarian system. 
The institutional balance in the Union is reflected in the fact that Union legislation takes place through 
a thoroughly checked process with oversized majorities in the institution representing the states 
(Council) and the institution representing the citizens (European Parliament). In the decision-making 
process, it is up to the Commission to mediate between the two institutions and to draw them to the 
general interest of the Union through its control over the drafting of legislative proposals. 
The need to respect the institutional balance requires any re-organisation of Union leadership to find a 
fine balance between the need to effectively pursue the common interest and the need to duly respect 
the interests and liberties of the different actors involved. It follows from what has just been said that 
leadership selection in the Union cannot be simply the subject of majority rule. In a majoritarian 
(‘fused’) model, the executive is able to dominate the legislature by commanding a secure majority in 
it (‘dictatorship of the executive’) (Hix, 2002b). As a consequence certain member states might be 
permanently excluded from power as they would be only represented in the minority.  
Rather than fusing legislative and executive powers, leadership in the Union should rather be subject 
to a system of checks and balances resembling the model of ‘divided government’. Such checks can be 
built into the functioning of the institutional triangle. The role of the Council is crucial in this respect, 
as it is part of the legislature but also a part of the executive. Structural guarantees are required to 
ensure that Union leadership will not be permanently alienated from any one member state. At the 
same time the European Parliament ought not to be monopolised by the executive, but should instead 
continue to play its role as ‘controlling parliament’ (Dann, 2002). Finally, as far as the Commission is 
concerned, its distinct and independent role should be preserved as much as possible.  
Thus, any reform of leadership in the Union will have to ensure that the relations with the 
intergovernmental and with the supranational institutions are properly looked after. Moreover, the 
relationship between intergovernmental and supranational institutions should also be well balanced, 
with neither structurally dominating the other. In particular, any re-organisation will need to take 
account of the risk that intergovernmental and supranational institutions end up in a political deadlock  T OWARDS EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNION 
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in which European decision-making is immobilised by the two kinds of institutions vetoing each 
other’s proposals. 
Table A.1 Three dimensions for evaluation  
Efficacy of office  Democracy  Institutional balance 
-  Coordinating powers 
-  Embeddedness 
-  (External) visibility 
-  Selection by merit 
-  Comprehensibility  
-  Openness  
-  Electoral choice 
-  Public appeal  
-  European political and public 
sphere 
-  Harmonious institutional 
balance 
-  Relations with 
intergovernmental institutions 
-  Relations with supranational 
institutions 
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